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PRIVATE SUITS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ADOLF HOMBURGER*

An abbreviated version of this paper was presented by the author
at a meeting of the Society of Comparative Law in Hamburg, Germany, on September 21, 1973. The full text, printed here, appears
also in the "Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung", published by the Society in Germany. While the paper was prepared for a foreign
audience, its unitary approach to the full range of private litigation
in the public interest-class actions, shareholders' derivative suits and
public interest actions-will be of considerable interest to American
readers. The Buffalo Law Review gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the Society of Comparative Law in arrangingpublication in the United States.
ScoPE oF REPORT

M

ost students of American law agree that the recent growth of
litigation instituted by private parties for the protection of
group or public interests is by far the most significant development in
contemporary civil procedure. While traditional litigation seeks the
judicial resolution of individual controversies, private suits in the
public interest have vastly enlarged the dimensions of a law suit.
Reaching beyond traditional confines, they seek adjudications which
transcend the interests of the parties before the court. In essence, therefore, "private suits in the public interest," as understood in this report,
are remedial devices which rely on private initiative to secure the
vindication of mass or public rights.
In general, the trend has been in the direction of strengthening
these devices despite awareness that they extend judicial authority to
the outer limits. In a system that normally endows all judicial organs
with the power to review the constitutionality of legislation and the
legality of governmental acts to the extent necessary for the disposition
of a case, the risk of upsetting delicate balances of power between the
* Profesor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence. D.U.J., University of Vienna, 1929; LL.B., University of Buffalo, 1941.
The writer gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor Joseph Laufer for
his valuable criticisms of a draft of this report and to Professor Daniel J. Gifford for
his helpful comments on Section III. Credit is also due to John L. Bulger and Christopher T. Greene for research assistance.
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judicial and political branches of the government is evident. However,
providing much needed access to court for the effective protection of
group and public interests is a goal that justifies the risk inherent in
enlarging judicial authority.
It is the purpose of this report to describe the remedial devices
which serve the new trend, to assess their benefits and burdens and to
speculate on their future. Section I deals with class actions, prosecuted
by one or more individuals on behalf of a numerous class similarly
situated; Section II deals briefly with shareholders' derivative suits,
prosecuted by one or more shareholders for the benefit of a corporation; Section III deals with public interest actions, prosecuted by individuals or organizations to challenge illegal governmental action affecting the public interest. In conclusion, the report reviews, in comparative perspective, the wide range of problems encountered in private
litigation in the public interest and suggests a functional approach
to an expanded public interest action that might relieve some of the
pressures in the area of class actions.
I
CLAsS ACTIONS

Introduction
The American legal profession knows more about class actions
today than ever before. It paid for this insight with much agonizing
about the reach and mechanics of a remedy of unprecedented power.
There is no quick and easy way to present American problems of mass
litigation to a foreign audience. However, an illustration might help
to introduce the subject. A recent federal case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,1 exemplifies some of the questions which are central to the
contemporary role of class actions in the American legal system.
The principal defendants in the action were two stockbrokers
1. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.) (dismissed as a class action), aff'd, 370 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Eisen I],rev'd and
remanded, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
rehearing 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (preliminary hearing on merits ordered, class
action status granted, "fluid class recovery" suggested), rehearing 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (preliminary findings of fact for purpose of allocating cost of notice, conclusion
that plaintiff-class likely to prevail), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.) (dismissed as a class
action), en bana hearing denied, (2d Cir.May 24, 1973), in 170 N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1973,
at 3, col. 3, cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 203) [hereinafter cited as Eisen II].
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on the New York Stock Exchange specializing in stock transactions
of less than 100 shares, commonly called "odd lots." During the period from 1962 to 1966 they sold odd lots to more than six million
small investors who paid special charges over and above the usual
broker fees. These special charges are called "odd-lot differentials."
The differential amounts to a fraction of a point per share for each
sale or purchase of an "odd lot."
Plaintiff Eisen, a small investor, charged that the defendant
brokerage firms had monopolized the odd-lot market and had fixed
these special charges in violation of the antitrust laws. He estimated
that he had paid them $259 in odd-lot differentials which included
illegal overcharges of $70.
Under the stated facts, Eisen had a claim against the brokers
for treble damages (i.e., $210) plus reasonable attorneys' fees. 2 He also
had a claim against the New York Stock Exchange for failure to exercise proper control over the charges made for these stock transactions.
While Eisen undoubtedly had an interest capable of legal protection,
it was equally clear that the prosecution of a separate action by him
alone would have been impracticable. Barring extraordinary incentives, no reasonable person would undertake prolonged and expensive
litigation in one of the most difficult areas of the law to recover
$210 damages. However, Eisen and his lawyer found that incentive in the opportunity to prosecute a class action. Assuming
the role of a private attorney general and champion of a common
cause, Eisen instituted an action on his own behalf and on behalf of
all other purchasers and sellers of odd-lots on the New York Stock
Exchange who suffered harm during the period in question as the result
of the alleged illegal overcharges, naming the two brokers and the
New York Stock Exchange as defendants. That action did not involve
a few hundred dollars and one single claimant, but a potential recovery of 65 million dollars and over six million claimants.
Thus enlarged in dimension, the law suit became a matter of
public concern. The public is vitally interested in a serious charge
which involves massive violations of the antitrust laws and affects millions of small investors in the United States and abroad. Confidence
in the stock market is shaken if member brokers of the stock exchange
breach their duties to the investors and if the administrative institu2. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. ch. 1, § 15 (1970).
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tions fail to perform their fiduciary duties of control and supervision.3
Moreover, by enlarging the stake to millions of dollars, Eisen was able
to secure competent counsel 4 and to start a law suit without awaiting
administrative action. Such action, if forthcoming at all, presumably
would have taken the form of preventive measures against future violations without disturbing the profits in the coffers of the brokerage
firms. It is interesting to note in that connection that, while the action
was pending, the odd-lot differential at the New York Stock Exchange
was reduced "due to increased efficiency in the handling of odd-lot
transactions." 5 One wonders if that reduction would have occured had
Eisen not started his action.
The Eisen case, which began in 1966, may never reach a trial
on the merits although there were several court encounters, including
no less than three at the appellate level." Most recently, the court of
appeals dismissed the class action in a landmark decision which
aroused much attention in the legal profession. 7 However, the last
word has not yet been spoken. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
after the court of appeals declined to hear the case en banc, not because
it was not worthy of consideration by the plenum, but because in
the court's opinion the fundamental questions raised by the case
required a speedy and definitive resolution by the Supreme Court.8
Eisen is not an isolated case. Mass litigation of similiar or even
greater magnitude in the antitrust, securities fraud and other areas is
common in the federal courts today. At the state level, there is an
ever increasing pressure to open state courts to class actions of all sorts,
including environmental and consumer actions. 9 The issues raised in
these cases often have major social and economic significance. In the
final analysis, class actions are but one way of enforcing rights which
exist on the books but are meaningless because there is no practical
way to protect them. Thus class actions may be seen as part of a world3. See 52 F.R.D. at 270.
4. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
5. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1972, at 37, col. 5, quoting Robert Haack, President of New
York Stock Exchange.
6. Eisen II, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); Eisen II, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968);
Eisen I, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
7. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
8. 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 203).
9. E.g., modern class action bills were introduced in the New York legislature both
in 1972 and 1973, but did not pass despite support by the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York and the Bar Association of the City of New York. See 28 RacoRD or
N.Y.C.B.A. 481 (1973).
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wide trend toward making the law work in reality, a trend that has
been noted by another author.' 0 Glass actions seek to achieve justice
where justice has failed in the past not because of a dearth of substantive rights but because there was no adequate and effective remedy
to enforce them.
The following discussion sketches first the evolution of class actions in the United States (part A) " and then assesses a recent backlash which threatens the future of class litigation (part B).
A. The Evolution of Class Actions in the United States
1. Origin and general characteristics.Class actions were known to
English Chancery practice as far back as the 17th century.1 2 Professor
Chafee called them an "off-shoot" of the broad and flexible equity rule
which required the joinder of all persons materially interested in the
subject of the litigation. 13 Representation of a class by one or more of
its members implemented that rule when actual joinder was impracticable and also unnecessary because of the similarity of the claims or de4
fenses involved.'
The United States imported class actions as part of England's legal
system. They were readily accepted by the American courts although
they departed from the fundamental principle that each litigant is
entitled to his day in court in person or by a self-chosen representative.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that they were tolerated, just as
courts tolerate access roads of necessity when the owner of real property finds himself landlocked. Class actions are such access roads of
necessity in situations when, as a practical matter, the traditional road
to justice is barred.
One reason for the acceptance of class actions and their recent
unprecedented growth is that they are able to meet a pressing social
10. See FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
726-29, 746-52 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon eds. 1973) (view of Professor Cappelletti).
1. Part A of this Section draws freely on a more detailed treatment of the subject,
in Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUMn. L. REV. 609 (1971)
and in 18 N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL REP. 221 (1952) (a study by the author prepared for
the Judicial Council of the State of New York).

12. Brown v. Booth, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 164, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (1690); How v. Tenants
of Broomsgrove, 1 Vern. 22 (1681) ; Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 282 (1676).
13. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950).
14. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Z. CHAFE , supra note 13, at
200-03.
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need for an effective mass remedy that is compatible with both the
adversary system and the Western world's preference for private vindication of private rights. Class actions are but a logical extension of the
notion that self-interest normally may be relied upon to develop the
truth in an adversarial context. We may trust a man to help his fellow
men if, by helping them, he helps himself. In the case of class actions,
that self-interest is often reinforced by the champion's ideological
motivation to serve a cause which has social significance. We would
be less than candid if we did not add that, at least in certain types of
class actions, the lawyers for the class may receive liberal allowances if
their efforts on behalf of the class are successful 1 -a circumstance that
undoubtedly has contributed to the popularity of the device among
the plaintiff bar.
The technical definition of a class action follows from what has
been said before. Class actions are actions prosecuted or defended by
one or more members of a class on their own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, when it is impracticable to join all members of the class as parties to the action.1"
Several points should be stressed at the outset. First, impracticability of joinder implies that it is impracticable to have the class
representative chosen by all members of the class. Therefore, class actions may be prosecuted by self-chosen representatives. Indeed, in the
rare case of a defendants' class, the representative of the class is chosen
by plaintiff.
The second point is that the judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, binds all members of the class if the representa.
tion was fair and adequate. The binding effect of a class action judgment was settled by the United States Supreme Court 120 years ago 17
and reaffirmed in 1921 in the landmark decision of Supreme Tribe of
Ben Hur v. Cauble.1 8
In general, class actions follow the regular course of procedure
in American courts of first instance. Plaintiff, without first obtaining
leave of court, starts the action like any other action, but designates
himself as a class representative suing on his own behalf and on behalf
of the other members of the class similarly situated. After filing suit,
15. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
16. See 18 N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL REP. 80, 221 (1952).

17. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
18. 255 U.S. 356 (1921); accord, Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
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the court is usually called upon to pass upon the propriety of maintaining a class action and to define the class. The federal rule expressly
requires that the status of the action be determined "as soon as practicable,"' 9 albeit tentatively, and subject to change as the action progresses. Except for provisions, some mandatory and others discretionary,
to notify the absent members of the class of the commencement of the
action and of other significant events,2 0 and a requirement of court
approval for dismissal, discontinuance or compromise of the action,2 1
there is no radical departure from the normal sequence of procedural
steps. However, the administrative tasks imposed upon the court and
the parties may be formidable, due to enlarged discovery proceedings,
the processing of notices to and from the class and particularly the
handling of individual claims and the distribution of the recovery.
The most distinctive feature of class litigation, however, may be
the uncommonly active role which the judge must play in the control and supervision of the proceedings. The public interest in the
prosecution of a class action is far greater than in ordinary civil litigation. It is the court's function to protect that interest as well as the interests of the absent members of the class. The successful management
of a class action, therefore, requires a procedure that leans more toward
court-prosecution than ordinarily is the case in the American system.
Most states have class action provisions modelled either after a
New York statute of 1849 (hereinafter referred to as the New York
rule) 22 or upon an elaboration of that rule which was incorporated
19. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (1). For the full text of the rule, see note 55 infra.
20. FED. R. Cr. P. 23(c) (2), (d) (2).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
22. Ch. 438, § 119, [1849] Laws of New York 639, amending New York's Field
Code of 1848, ch. 379 [1848] Laws of New York 497. The Field Code, which had a
profound effect upon the development of procedure in the United States, was drafted by
a three-man commission headed by David Dudley Field. See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS
21-23 (2d ed. 1947). States that have retained the provision in the original form or with
slight modifications include: Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 128 (1958); Arkansas, ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (Supp. 1962); California, CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 382 (West
1973); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (1943); New York, N.Y. CIv. PAc. LAW
& RULES § 1005 (McKinney 1972); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 253
(1960); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 13.170 (Supp. 1961); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-205 (1962); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957). Florida's class
action rule, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220, is identical with Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1912,
which merged the first and second clause of the Field Code Rule. That rule reads as
follows:
When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220. North Carolina, N.C.R. Civ. P. 23; Maine, ME. R.P. 23; and
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in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938.23 In 1966 the original

federal rule was completely revised. 24 Since then some 13 states
have adopted the new federal rule. 25 A few states have no class action
provisions, but may allow class actions under equity practice.
Rhode Island, R.I.R. Civ. P. 23, have the following provision incorporating the second
clause of the Field Code Rule:
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.
Ch. 379, § 119, [1848] Laws of New York 553.
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-105 (1960), modified the second clause
of the Field Code Rule to read as follows:
When the persons who might be made parties are very numerous, so that
it would be impracticable or unreasonably expensive to make them all parties,
one or more may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the court to defend
for the benefit of all.
Id. Pennsylvania, PA. R. Civ. P. 2230 provides as follows:
(a) If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable
to join all as parties, any one or more of them who will adequately represent
the interests of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all, but the judgment entered
in such action shall not impose personal liability upon anyone not a party
thereto.
Id.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938) (repealed). The original rule, now defunct in the
federal courts, governs still today in a number of states. Its draftsman, Professor Moore,
created three categories of class actions, based on the substantive nature of the rights asserted by or against the class. He called the class action "true" when the right asserted
by or against the class was "joint" or "common." He called the class action "hybrid"
when the right was several and the object of the action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property; and he called the class action "spurious" when the right was
several and there was a common question of law or fact. In reality, there were only two
categories of class actions since the spurious type was envisaged merely as a device facilitating the actual joinder of the persons composing the class. See Homburger, supra note
11, at 628-29.
The following states have class action provisions based on the original Federal Rule
23 utilizing Moore's "true," "hybrid" and "spurious" categories: Alaska, ALAS. R. Civ. P.
23; Idaho, IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23; Iowa, IoWA R. Cxv. P. 42; Michigan, MICH. GEN. CT.
R. 208; Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.070 (1952); Nevada, Nav. R. Civ. P. 23; New
Jersey, N.J. R. Crv. Fpc. 4:36-1; New Mexico, N.M. R. Civ. P. 23; North Dakota,
N.D. R. Civ. P. 23; Texas, TEx. R. Civ. P. 42; West Virginia, W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23;
Wyoming, Wyo. R. Cirv. P. 23.
Georgia has class action provisions based on the original Federal Rule 23 utilizing
only the "true" and "hybrid" categories. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-123 (1967).
Louisiana's provision, LA. CODE or Civ. P. ANN. art. 591 (West 1960), provides
only for a "true" class action, omitting all reference to the "hybrid" and "spurious" categories.
Alabama's class action rule, ALA. Eq. R. 31, follows the original federal rule as to
'Moore's three categories but adds a fourth category, permitting a class action where the
interests of non-parties are "contingent" or "executory."
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938), as amended, FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (effective July 1,
1966).
25. The following states have class action provisions which are substantially the
same as the new federal rule 23: Arizona, ARsz. R. Civ. P. 23; Colorado, COLO. R. Civ.

1P. 23; Delaware,

DEL. CH. CT.

R. 23; Indiana,

IND.

R. OF

TLAxL

P. 23; Kentucky, Ky.
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2. Class actions under the New York rule. New York's present
statute typifies the old style of class action provision. Section 1005 (a)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. 2 6
The New York rule is poorly drafted. The phrase "question ...
of a common or general interest" in the first alternative clause does
not indicate the nature or strength of the requisite bond between the
class members. The second alternative clause which purports to authorize a class action when the class is very numerous and joinder is impracticable, is too narrow if limited to compulsory joinder situations,
and too broad if indiscriminately applied whenever joinder is per27
mitted.
As a matter of fact, the courts in New York and other states give
no more than lip service to such statutory language. After abandoning
earlier attempts to distinguish between class actions under the first
and second clause, 28 they fashioned, by combining the two branches
of the provision, four distinct requirements for the maintenance of class
actions: (1) numerousness of persons similarly situated; (2) adequacy
of representation of the interests of the class; (3) impracticability of
actual joinder of the members of the class; and (4) "privity" between
the members of the class. The first three prerequisites are relatively
non-controversial and need only be briefly discussed here. The privity
requirement, on the other hand, merits more extensive treatment since
it constitutes the point where the present federal rule departs from
its precursors.
(1) Numerousness. There was a time when the courts allowed
class actions although the class was not so numerous as to preclude as
R. CIv. P. 23; Minnesota, MINN. CT. R. 23; Montana, MONT. R. CIv. P. 23; North Dakota, N.D. R. CIv. P. 23; Ohio, Orno R. Civ. P. 23; South Dakota, S.D. Compw. LAws
§ 15-6-23 (1967); Utah, UTAH R. Civ. P. 23; Vermont, VT. R. CIv. P. 23.
The Kansas class action provision, KAN. Civ. PRo. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (Vernon
1967), as amended, id. (Supp. 1970) is similar to new federal rule 23 except that (c) (1)
empowers the court, upon motion or its own initiative, to order that a nonclass suit be
maintained as a class action "where necessary for the protection of a party or absent
persons. ... " Id. § 60-223(c) (1).
26. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 1005 (McKinney 1972).

27. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 614.
28. See McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
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a practical matter the actual joinder of the members.2 0 Today, numerousness, which is an express condition under the federal rule,80 is
also generally recognized as a prequisite to maintaining a class action
under the New York rule.3 1 However, our contemporary problem in
the federal courts at least, is not the undersized, but the oversized
class which presents formidable and sometimes insuperable management problems.
(2) Adequacy of representation. This prerequisite is the key
to the constitutionality of the device. The would-be champion cannot
speak for the class unless he can show that he will be an adequate
spokesman. Adequacy of representation must be maintained throughout the proceedings. Absent waiver, lack of adequacy of representation
is a defense against the conclusiveness of a class action judgment. That
defense is always available to a class member who was not before the

court in person. 32 It follows that the opponent of the class, at least when

he senses victory, should be concerned about the adequacy of the class'
representation to insure that judgment in his favor would be binding
on the class.
(3) Impracticability of joinder. Resort to a class action is unjustified when actual joinder of the members composing the class is
practicable. Impracticability of joinder goes hand in hand with numerousness. When a class is numerous, joinder normally is impracticable. In judging impracticability of joinder, the interests of the individual members in controlling separate actions and the practicability
of maintaining separate actions should be weighed. 33
From the vantage point of impracticability of joinder, civil rights
29. Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y.S. 822
(1907); Hilton Bridge Constr. Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338, 57 N.Y.S. 140 (Sup. Ct.)
aff'd mem., 42 App. Div. 630, 59 N.Y.S. 1106 (3d Dep't 1899); McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). See Hogan v. Williams, 185 Misc. 338, 55
N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 789, 59 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dcp't
1946).
30. FErD. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
31. However, the courts have occasionally approved comparatively small classes. See
18 N.Y. JUD. CouNcIL REP. 80, 221, 226-29 (1952).
In Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1966), the court approved a class composed of 31 limited partners in a real estate
syndicate.
32. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See Homburger, supra note 11, at 646.
33. Homburger, supra note 11, at 636-37, 654. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) (a).
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litigation and consumer complaints involving numerous small claimants are particularly appealing for class treatment. In civil rights cases,
the complainant usually is more interested in questioning the legality
of the defendant's conduct with reference to the class as a whole than
with respect to himself, individually.3 4 In consumer cases, small claimants are frequently trapped between impracticability of joinder and
impracticability of proceeding alone.3 5 While both types of situations
easily pass muster under the impracticability-of-joinder test, they may
fail to satisfy the privity test to be discussed next.
(4) Privity. The most troublesome requirement for maintaining a class action under the New York rule is the existence of "a
question

. . .

of a common or general interest." Similar language may

be found in old equity cases which associated that phrase with the
ancient notion of "privity"; these cases would not admit that in the
absence of "privity" avoidance of multiplicity of suit is an independent
ground for exercising equity jurisdiction.3 6 By reading the New York
rule in the light of the old equity practice, privity became a stumbling
block to a functional interpretation of the New York rule. Unfortunately, nobody can be quite sure of what privity means. Under feudal
law, it expressed a substantive relationship of one sort or another
which gave rise to legal consequences.3 7 Roscoe Pound, reflecting on the
notion of privity, said: "So completely has this idea taken possession of
equity that more than one subject, for example interpleader and bills
of peace, is embarrassed by a struggle to find 'privity', a struggle to find
38
some relation to which the right to relief may be annexed."
Regardless of its historical origins, the ill-defined notion of privity
produced a mass of cases which turned on substantive rights rather
than considerations of procedural convenience or necessity. The prevailing view in New York is that class actions are limited to three situations: (1) where the substantive right asserted by or against the class
is joint or common; (2) where the subject matter of the controversy
34. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) ;
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). In fact, in a school
desegregation case, the court even questioned whether individual relief could properly
be granted in this type of situation. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
35. Homburger, supra note 11, at 640-42.
36.

See 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 255, 268, 269

(4th ed. 1918), citing numerous authorities supporting the restrictive theory.
37. Homburger, supranote 11, at 615-16.
38. R. POUND, THE SPIUT OF THE CoMMoN LAW 25 (1921).
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is a limited fund or specific property which is affected by the claims
or defenses asserted in the action; or (3) where the relief sought is
common to all in the sense that satisfaction of the individual claims
of the parties before the court will automatically satisfy the claims of
all others.3 9 For example, New York courts sustained a class action on
behalf of the limited partners of a real estate syndicate for damages
resulting from fraudulent manipulations of profits by the general partners; 40 for ratable distribution of the proceeds of a surety bond payable
to creditors of an absconded debtor; 41 and for an injunction on behalf
of owners subjected to a common nuisance.4 Similar views prevail in
other states which follow the New York rule,43 with the exception of
California, where the courts, by a broad interpretation of the New
York rule, have reached conclusions similar to the new federal rule to
44
be discussed later.
What has been said does not explain why most state courts operating under the New York rule cling to the confining concept of privity. At least two good reasons suggest themselves. One is that the New
York rule fails to furnish the courts functional criteria for identifying
situations suitable for class treatment and to provide adequate guidelines for managing class actions.4 5 The other has overtones of social
philosophy. Most jurisdictions operating under the New York rule have
failed to understand the contemporary mission of class actions. The
need for an effective group remedy in our days is not confined to consensual relationships between the class members. Large and dispersed
groups of unrelated individuals frequently find themselves in a situation which, as a practical matter, is unsuitable for the maintenance of
individual actions or the actual joinder of the parties in interest.
Save for class actions, no relief would be available in these cases to
vindicate wrongs committed on a mass basis. Situations of that sort
are common not only in the field of antitrust, securities fraud and
civil rights litigation, which presently make up the bulk of class acA.

39. See 18 N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL REP. 217, 230 (1952); 2 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN &
MILLER, NEw YORK CIvIL PRACTICE § 1005.2 (1970).

40. Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1966).
41.
42.
43.
44.
(1967).
45.

Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909).
Greer v. Smith, 155 App. Div. 420, 140 N.Y.S. 43 (2d Dep't 1913).
Homburger, supra note 11, at 621-25.
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3).
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tions in the federal courts, but also in wide areas of consumer protection, welfare legislation, environmental protection and other mass
grievances which arise from collective modes of life in contemporary
society. Although in these types of cases no jural relationship unites
the members of the class, they find themselves, often fortuitously, in
precisely the same factual or legal relationship vis-h-vis the opponent
of the class and in the same predicament. They are too numerous and
too dispersed to be joined as parties and their claims are too small to
justify the cost, time and effort involved in individual litigation. While
in some cases injunctive or declaratory relief may be available under
the rubric of "common relief," actions seeking separate monetary relief on behalf of a class usually fail because there is no preexisting consensual relation between its members. As was stated by one author describing the erratic results reached by the courts under the New York
rule: "Class actions were not permitted when they should have been
46
and were allowed when they should not have been."
A classic New York case, decided in 1988, well illustrates the
desperate situation of an individual claimant who seeks justice in a
state court under the New York rule. Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union
Gas Co.4 7 involved the breach of a statute that expressly prohibited

special service charges in addition to charges for gas supplied by the
utility. The plaintiff, suing on his own behalf and on behalf of the
other consumers similarly situated, protested a charge of one dollar for
reconnecting a gas line after discontinuance of service. The court held
that the charge was illegal, granted an injunction against collection
of the charge and a declaratory judgment, but held that the plaintiff
class was not entitled to an accounting for money illegally collected.
The accounting was denied not only because the plaintiff had not yet
paid the charge and therefore was not a proper representative of those
claimants who had paid it, but, more importantly, because the defendant was able to respond in damages and because there was no threat of
multiplicity of suit and no limited fund for distribution to creditors.
The net effect of the decision was a Pyrrhic victory for Kovarsky. He
escaped a one dollar service fee and protected the consumers of gas
from future exploitation, but he lost a fortune in attorney's fees, or
more likely, the attorneys were deprived of just compensation for ex46. 2 J. WEINSTEIN4, H. KORN & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1005.2.
47. 279 N.Y.304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
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tensive and beneficial services rendered in the interest of the public.
Yet, upon reflection, it seems that for a number of reasons the case
would have been well suited for granting monetary relief to the class.
The prosecution of individual actions by gas consumers, each asserting
a claim for one dollar, would have been wholly impracticable. Likewise, the actual joinder of all gas consumers was impracticable. The
claims were uniform, invariable and involved precisely the same
issues of law and fact. No relief could be expected from an administrative agency since the Public Service Commission, which is entrusted
with the protection of consumer interests, joined forces with the public
utility in defending against the claim. 48 Finally, there was a strong
policy in favor of protective action against the gouging of the public
by a monopolistic supplier. Nonetheless, the true victor was the Brooklyn Union Gas Co. which in the end retained a very substantial sum
of money representing the charges illegally collected. The relief
granted was prospective rather than retrospective and encouraged rather
than discouraged future wrongdoing.
To the present day the mainstream of decisions under the New
York rule follows lines similar to Kovarsky. The privity rule, applied
mechanically and often thoughtlessly, forecloses a functional approach
to class treatment. Characteristic of this treatment is a statement in a
leading New York case,49 decided in 1939, that has been quoted over
and over again by many courts in many states:
Separate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a
common or general interest in those who are wronged. 0
We would have no quarrel with that pronouncement, had the
courts been willing to give content and meaning to the word "alone"
by examining in each case the functional and public interest considerations in support of granting mass relief. Only the courts of California summoned the strength to break the tyranny of the privity rule
by reinterpreting the New York rule without the support of a modern
statute. 1
48. Id. at 306, 18 N.E.2d at 288.
49. Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d
374 (1939).
50. Id. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
51. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724

(1967).
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3. Class actions under the federal rule of 1966. While New York
cannot pride itself in having a modem class action rule, it was at least
the first state to adopt one. The New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules, as enacted in 1962,5 abandoned the sterile notion of privity

and in its place substituted four functional prerequisities to the maintenance of a class action: (1) a class so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) claims or defenses that are typical of the claims or defenses

of all; and (4) fair and adequate protection of the interests of the class
by the representative parties. However, before the effective date of

the new code, forces hostile to a modem class action rule gained the
upper hand and restored the old New York rule.53 Curiously, Maryland fashioned its 1962 class action rule after the aborted New York

bill.54 More importantly, the New York bill became the cornerstone
of new federal rule 23, promulgated in 1966. No attempt will be

made in this report to describe the complexities of the new rule in detail. A brief synopsis of its basic structure and content should suffice
to acquaint the reader with its general thrust.55
52. Ch. 308 [1962] Laws of New York 593 (now codified as N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
& RULES (McKinney 1972)).
53. Civil Practice Law and Rules Amendments § 4, ch. 318, § 4, [1962] Laws of
New York 1248f (now codified as N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 1005 (McKinney
1972)). The Advisory Committee itself wavered back and forth between the Field Code
provision and its new proposal. See N.Y. ADvIsORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT 34-37 (1957). The study bill introduced in 1960 reinstated the Field Code provision (Civil Practice Act § 195). However, after further consideration and consultation with the bar, the Advisory Committee reverted to its original

proposal. See N.Y.

ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT

A 333-34 (Advance Draft 1961); N.Y. ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FIFTH PRELIAINARY REPORT 307-09 (1961); 2 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A.
MILLER, supra note 39, § 1005.04; Homburger, supra note 11, at 631 n.132.

54. MID. R.P. 209 (effective Jan. 1, 1962).
55. New rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted on Feb. 28,

1966, Order of the Supreme Court, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966), effective July 1, 1966. The
full text of the rule reads as follows:
RULE 23.

CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
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action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members
of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider
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Subdivision (a) which is substantially identical with the 1962 New
York bill enumerates the general prerequisities to a class action. The
provision flatly substitutes for the outdated notion of privity a functional prerequisite, namely questions of law or fact common to the
class. The class action plaintiff must also fit his case into one of three
categories defined in subdivision (b), each of which purports to cover
a particular situation appropriate for class treatment.
Subdivision (b) (1) deals largely with cases where class treatment
operates as an escape device from compulsory rules of joinder. Subdivision (b) (2) describes situations where a party seeks declaratory or
injunctive relief which, as a practical matter, automatically benefits
the entire class. The principal applications of that subdivision are civil
rights cases whose suitability for class treatment under the federal
rule has never been in doubt. 56 It is fair to say that the two subdivisions add little that is new.
Subdivision (b) (3) refines one of the four prerequisites stated
in subdivision (a) and adds a fifth general prerequisite for any class
action. More specifically, it requires that the common questions of
law or fact predominate over any question affecting individual members and that the class action be superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. It should be
noted that subdivision (a) mentions neither the predominance of the
common elements, nor the superiority of the class action device. Upon
reflection, it appears that "predominance" and "superiority" are7
5
general characteristics of all situations suitable for class treatment.
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16,
and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
56. See note 34 supra.
23.45(1), at 707-08 (2d ed. 1969);
57. See 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrscE
Homburger, supra note 11, at 634-36; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAmv. L. REv.
356, 390 n.130 (1967). In the event of an overlap, the case should preferably be typed
as a (b)(1) or (b)(2) case. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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The rule aids the court in applying these tests by a list of factors intended to guide the court's discretion.
The innate complexity of the new rule is aggravated by a labyrinth
of provisions governing notice and class composition. Class actions under subdivision (b) (3) are subject to special mandatory provisions
governing notice of commencement of the action to class members,58
the privilege of class members to exclude themselves from class membership by "opting-out ' 59 and the right to appear in the action if they
60
remain in the class.
Rounding out the statutory scheme, the rule contains provisions
which regulate the res judicata effect of a class action judgment,0 ' suggest a program of management of class actions, and underscore the
need for flexible judicial piloting of the suit from the beginning to
the end, including dismissal or compromise.0 2 The maze of provisions,
however, should not divert attention from the core of the new rule.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) (3) have broken the iron grip of the rule of
privity and opened the door to judicial resolution of mass grievances,
resting on common questions of law or fact. The explosive response to
the new opportunities afforded by the rule reveals the force of pentup social pressures which asserted themselves quite unexpectedly soon
after the amendment. It is not surprising therefore that this procedural
enfranchisement of large segments of the population has produced
counterpressures bent on purging the remedy or, at least, enfeebling
it to the point where it no longer poses a threat. We next turn to a
consideration of that movement.
B. The Backlash Against Massive ClassActions
Hailed by some, damned by others, the new federal rule is the
most controversial procedural development on the American scene in
the last decade. The expanded reach of the rule has evoked heated
scholarly debate and cries of protest from those who fear its bite. Principal targets of the backlash have been class actions under rule 23 (b) (3)
seeking redress for massive violations of the antitrust and securities laws
as well as other types of consumer fraud. The epithets applied to the
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at (c)(3), (d), (e).
62. The literature abounds. For a selective bibliography up to 1971, see 26 REcoRD
or N.Y.C.B.A. 412-18 (1971).
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enlarged remedy (hereinafter called "common question class suit")
have not been flattering. Class actions have been called "a form of
legalized blackmail"63 and "potential engines of destruction."6 4 When
the question of "class action vel non" reached the court of appeals in
the Eisen case for the first time in 1968, one of the judges implored
his colleagues to "put an end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a
class action."6 5 The same court on its last encounter with Eisen in 1973
castigated the use of "cliches" and "rhetorical devices" in legal discourse, 66 but, a few pages later observed that "class actions have
sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the green bay tree." 67
Since colorful language alone will not subdue the "monster,"
those opposing the new class actions have mustered historical, constitutional, jurisdictional, administrative, substantive, professional and
socioeconomic arguments to discredit their use. What is the strength
of these arguments?
1. The historical argument. The opposition makes much of the
fact that the draftsmen of the amended rule visualized the common
question class suit merely as a tool of procedural convenience and not
as a device to open the courts to persons whose claims would otherwise never be litigated. 68 It is true that the primary purpose of rule
23 (b) (3) was to "achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable
results." 69 However, the draftsmen apparently had a premonition of
impending developments when they drafted the rule. The Advisory
Committee's notes refer in passing to the plight of claimants in cases
where "the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that
separate suits would be impracticable." 70 Professor (now Judge) Kaplan, the reporter to the Advisory Committee, has approved the en63. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 26 REcOOD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 124, 130
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Handler, 23rd Review).
64. Smith v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Civ. Nos. 860-71, 861-71, 862-71, (D.N.J., July 23,
1971) (oral opinion); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction,
55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
65. Eisen II, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1958) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
66. Eisen II, 479 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 1018.
68. Simon, supra note 64, at 376.
69. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966).
70. Id. at 104
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larged role of the remedy; three years after its promulgation he saw
as one of its principal functions its capacity to serve as a "means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually would be
without effective strength to bring the opponents into court at all,"
notwithstanding a possible increase in litigation. 71
Whatever may have been in the minds of the draftsmen, it is
the genius of the common law that its judges stand ready to fashion
new procedures or to adapt existing ones to pressing current needs.
Using the new rule for a larger purpose that may or may not have been
originally contemplated reflects a sensitive judicial response to social
pressure for a workable group remedy. Bringing small claims within
the framework of the revised rule may occasionally strain its wording,
but it does not strain its basic philosophy.
2. Constitutional arguments-notice. No one doubts today that
class actions are compatible with basic notions of due process. More
than thirty years ago the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of class actions explicitly in Hansberry v. Lee72 so long as "the procedure adopted, fairly ensures the protection of the interests of the absent
parties who are to be bound by it."73 Due process is a pragmatic concept. When neither the actual joinder of a large group of persons nor
the prosecution or defense of separate actions is practicable, the fundamental guarantee of access to court prevails over the right to a day in
court in person or by a self-chosen representative; for as stated above,
adequate representation of the group interests is assured by the selfinterest of those who champion the common cause.
The Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee required class action
procedure to be "so devised and applied as to insure that those present
are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common
issue"; 74 yet it never articulated the specific requirements of procedural fairness in class actions. In particular, the Court never clarified
the function and constitutional implications, if any, of notice to absent
members of the class. The lower federal courts split widely on the
issue. The court of appeals in Eisen took the firm position that notice
71. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to "The Class Action-A Symposium". 10 B.C. IND.

& Commz.
72.
73.
74.

L. REv. 497 (1969).
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
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is a due process requirement in class actions of every type.7 5 However,
rule 23 contains no notice provision for the two particular categories
of class actions defined by subdivision (b) (1) and (b) (2) and only
a loose and obscurely worded provision for common question class actions under (b) (3):
[T]he court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.76
Does this provision require individual notice to all identifiable
members of the class even if this is impracticable? If the answer is
Ityes," most consumer type class actions and other small claimants' class
suits are doomed; the expense of individual notice to a very large
group is prohibitive, and inevitably would lead to the dismissal of the
case as a class action because it is unmanageable. This is precisely what
happened in Eisen. On its last encounter with that case, the court of
appeals not only insisted on individual notice to more than two million
identifiable members of the class, but also held that, at least in the
Eisen type of situation, the expense of notification must be borne in
77
toto by the plaintiff.
Other courts have taken a far more lenient view, preferring a
flexible approach to the problem of notice. They reject the theory that
78
notice is a general prerequisite to the maintenance of any class action
and are loath to dismiss an otherwise viable common question class
action merely because individual notice is economically impracticable.
In a number of cases, imaginative judges tailored the required notice
to the exigencies of the case and devised effective methods of notification, short of individual notice, which financially and administratively
were not overly burdensome. 79
Leaving aside for the moment the constitutional problem, the
wording of the rule seems to permit such broad reading. All the rule
requires is "the best notice practicable under the circumstances." Included among the modes of notification which the court may select is
75. 391 F.2d at 564-65.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
77. 479 F.2d at 1005.
78. See, e.g., Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D.Md. 1972); Johnson v.
City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 50 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. La. 1970).
79. See, e.g., Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See Homburger, supra
note 11, at 643-44; Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313,

318-22 (1973).
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individual notice to all members who are identifiable. It does not follow, however, that other modes of notification are excluded. Particularly when the interest of the absent members in controlling the litigation is minimal, the cost of individual notice prohibitive and effective representation of the class attainable without it, the court should
be free to fashion any appropriate manner of notification.
The question remains whether the Constitution demands individual notice to all identifiable class members. The importance of
notice as a hallmark of the integrity of the proceedings is not to be
slighted. Like any other agent, the class representative owes a general
duty to those whom he represents to inform them of the steps taken
on their behalf, including the commencement and progress of the action. However, it is one thing to admit that reasonable notice is generally required, and quite another to demand individual notice rigidly
and indiscriminately even in the absence of functional needs and at
the risk of rendering a class action unmanageable.
Much of the difficulty in handling notice problems in class actions
stems from the failure of the courts to distinguish between the broad
concept of procedural due process and the far narrower concept of
jurisdictional due process that assures fairness in acquiring adjudicatory power over parties with adversarial interests. The Supreme Court
cases usually cited to support a rigid individual notice requirement in
class actions are Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 80 and
Schroeder v. City of New York. 81 In both cases the adversarial relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and the default
consequences attending a defendant's failure to appear required strict
notice standards in compliance with the demands of jurisdictional due
process. However, these standards do not necessarily apply to the nonadversarial relationship between the representative of the class and the
absentee members where the primary function of notice is merely to
assure their adequate representation.
The question of the effect of notice or its absence on the right to
opt-out which is discussed elsewhere s2 need not be dwelt on here. As
a practical matter, as is well known to the courts, few persons, if any,
exercise the right to opt-out in small claimants' class suits when the
economic interest in controlling the litigation is minimal.
80. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
81. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
82. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 646.
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3. Jurisdictionallimitations. A problem of federal jurisdiction in
class actions reached the Supreme Court in 1969 in Snyder v. Harris83
The question was whether federal district courts have subject matter
jurisdiction in common questions class actions when the aggregate of
the claims of all members of the class exceeds the sum of $10,000 required for federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, but the
claim of each named class representative does not reach that amount.
Applying judge-made rules governing subject matter jurisdiction
in the case of joinder of parties, the court concluded that it is not permissible to add the separate and distinct claims to reach the prescribed
jurisdictional amount. The doctrinal weakness of the Court's reasoning,
exposed in a forceful dissent,84 may have impelled the majority to
stress the underlying policy considerations. The federal system, we are
told, must be protected from being overloaded by class actions. We may
concede that a policy of restricting federal jurisdiction in diversity
cases may be justifiable when an alternative route to justice leads into
the state courts. However, in class actions that route is frequently
barred by the absence of adequate state provisions. Once the parties are
denied the shelter of federal jurisdiction, no court, state or federal will
open its doors for them.
The Snyder holding had another unfortunate result. It resurrected the defunct requirement of privity for jurisdiction. Claims
which are "separate and distinct" and therefore non-aggregable must be
distinguished from those which are "joint" or "common" and therefore aggregable. As already noted, that distinction, notwithstanding the
Court's assertion to the contrary,8 5 is obscure and unworkable.
Professor Kaplan expressed the hope that the Supreme Court's
"aberration" will be temporary8 6 Unfortunately, the trend seems to
87
be otherwise. In the recent case of Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.
the Supreme Court extended the Snyder doctrine. Affirming the lower
courts,8 8 it held that each member of the class, whether or not present
in court, must satisfy the jurisdictional requirement as to amount.
4. The administrative burden of class litigation.It has been argued
that class actions have intolerably burdened the federal courts by add83. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 342-57 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 341.
Kaplan, supra note 71, at 498.
94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), aff'g 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt.); 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ing to already crowded court calendars an ever increasing volume of
complex and protracted cases.8 9 Reliable statistical data to support that
charge are lacking. The American College of Trial Lawyers, which is
on record as opposing common question class suits, 90 collected statistical data based on a review of all civil dockets in the Southern District
of New York from July 1, 1966 to December 1, 1971. 91 According to
these data, three and one half times as many class actions were started
in 1971 than in 1967, the first full year of operation under the
amended rule. Yet it appears that of 29,673 actions brought since
July 1966, only 1,339-less than 5% were class actions. We do not
know how many of them were brought under rules 23 (b) (1) and (2).
Even the American College of Trial Lawyers does not question the
propriety and usefulness of these latter actions.9 2 The statistics apparently do not consider the general increase of litigation between 1966
and 1971; furthermore, many of the cases listed as "still pending"9"
may in fact be dormant. Thus an unbiased statistical evaluation of
the impact of class litigation in the United States must await more
complete data. 94
Frequently, the argument that class actions on behalf of small
claimants place a crushing burden upon the courts is reinforced by
the claim that these actions transform the federal tribunals into "small
claims courts."'9 5 Focusing upon the size of the injury to the individual, and not upon the size of the defendant's wrong, the critics contend that the federal courts should not concern themselves with such
"trivial" matters. Strangely the same critics also complain that massive
class actions on behalf of small claimants threaten the defendants'
economic existence. 96 Thus in the same breath, they complain that the
claims are too small and too large. Moreover, since the decision in
89. Handler, 23rd Review, supra note 63, at 134; Simon, supra note 64, at 377.

See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 753,
770 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Handler, 24th Review].
90. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOiMENDATIONS OF
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE
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(1972).

91. Id. at 13-15.
92. Id. at 4.

93. Id. at 13.
94. These may eventually be supplied by a comprehensive review of class litigation projected in 1972 by the staff of the Committee on Commerce of the United States

Senate. See

STAFF REViEv OF CLASS ACTION LEGISLATION, COMMITTEE ON COMIMIERCE,

SENATE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
95. Simon, supra note 64, at 377. See also Handler, 23rd Review, supra note 63, at
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96. Simon, supra note 64, at 394.
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Snyder v. Harris,97 federal jurisdiction over small claims, as a practical

matter, is limited to cases where Congress has granted federal jurisdiction without monetary limitation and thus clearly expressed a
policy in favor of enforcement of the law regardless of the size of the
claims asserted. This is particularly true of antitrust and securities
fraud litigation where it was merely the prohibitive cost of suing for
small amounts that had discouraged the little man's suit and, indirectly,
encouraged business to violate the law so long as the damage inflicted
upon individuals was small and the political climate rendered governmental law enforcement unlikely.
While common question class actions may not have added greatly
to the overall volume of litigation in the federal courts, it cannot be
denied that the ensuing litigation is often complex, protracted and
expensive. Particularly antitrust and securities fraud cases, which since
Snyder constitute the bulk of common question class litigation, present
extraordinary difficulties and make consuming demands on both the
court and counsel. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why individual
prosecution of small claims in that area is wholly impracticable and
mass remedies are needed to cope with socially destructive conduct affecting large segments of the population.
In the hands of capable judges who understand and accept their
enlarged role in class litigation and are willing to use their broad discretionary powers forcefully and imaginatively, most technical difficulties which complicate class management are surmountable. More
specifically, courts should be selective in certifying classes; they should
consider the good faith of the representative parties and the probability of success; and they should lay at least tentative plans for
the management of the action from the very outset.
Since certification of a class lies in the sound discretion of the
court, it should also be proper for the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to give weight to the public interest in the litigation. 98 Compare a class action instituted to vindicate the rights of members of the
Playboy Club to receive bar chits, 99 or a class action threatening the opponent of the class with "a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any bene97.
98.
N.Y.S.2d
99.
1969).

394U.S. 332 (1969).
See Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 403, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723, 311
281, 285 (1970) ; Homburger, supra note 11, at 639-43.
Grossman v. Playboy Club Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 882939, (Super. Ct., L.A., Cal.
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fit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation
of The Truth in Lending Act,"' 00 with a class action that forces a taxicab company to disgorge unjustified charges collected from thousands
of unsuspecting customers through improper setting of taxi meters. 10 1 Is
it not self-evident that these actions are not on the same level of social
significance and do not deserve the same treatment?
The question remains how the court should go about collecting
the relevant data for a reasoned decision on the propriety of class
treatment. Several lower courts have used the device of a preliminary
hearing on the pertinent issues, including the merits of the claim, before they will certify a class. 10 2 On the other hand, two appellate courts,
including the Eisen court, roundly condemned the practice of such
03
a "mini-heaing" on the merits.

It is difficult to assume that the draftsmen of the rule who charged
the court explicitly with the duty to determine the propriety of a class
action "[a]s soon as practicable" intended to deny it the power to
hold a preliminary hearing on all the matters bearing on the exercise
of the court's discretion, including the merits of the claims asserted 0 4
Courts frequently are called upon in light of limited data, to make
preliminary and tentative decisions, which embrace issues also involved
in the final disposition of the case. For example, every day in state and
federal practice, courts must decide, for jurisdictional purposes, questions of fact which will come up again upon the trial of the merits.
Similarly, tentative factual determinations are made when a court passes
on an application for a preliminary injunction or other provisional
05
remedy.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1968). See Ratner v. Chemical Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412,

416 (1972).

101. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967).
102. See Eisen II, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed,
443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501-03 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1781(c) (West 1973). An extensive "mini-hearing" on the merits in the Dolgow case
led to the denial of the class action status and a summary judgment for defcndants, 53
F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), af'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) without considering the
propriety of the "mini-hearing."
103. 479 F.2d at 1015; Miller v. Mackey Int'l Inc., 252 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1), (d) (3). See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
105. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Homburger, The
Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO L. RV. 61,
84-87 (1965).
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5. The substantive impact of class actions. A respected federal
judge observed recently that "[a]s a general principle, and the 1966
revision of rule 23 is no exception, procedural change has a substantive
impact. It makes litigation easier for plaintiffs or defendants, thereby
affecting the substantive balance between the two."' 10 However, it
is frequently charged that class treatment subverts substantive rights.
Obviously, this charge cuts deeper. It implies that overenthusiastic
courts are inclined to disregard rules of substantive law in order to
force cases into the mold of class actions. 107 The indictment is serious
and merits scrutiny.
Situations ideally suited for treatment as a common question
class action are in short supply. They presuppose a numerous (but
not too numerous) class composed of readily identifiable individuals,
each having a claim that raises precisely the same issues of law and
fact. If the actions were confined to that rare breed, the usefulness of
the remedy would be very limited. Rule 23 therefore allows limited
departures from this optimum even if they complicate the management
of class actions. However, there comes a point when the administrative
burden outweighs the benefits of class treatment. Once that point is
reached, class treatment is inappropriate. Under no circumstances
should the courts circumvent management problems by compromising
rules of substantive law. The specific accusation, however, is that courts
have subverted substantive law (1) by ignoring elements of the claims
which do not lend themselves to class treatment because they are not
common to all members of the class, 0 8 and (2) by allowing recoveries
for the benefit of the class as a whole rather than the individuals who
have the substantive right to recover. 10 9
Let us take up first the charge that some courts simply ignore the
existence of substantive issues not suitable for class treatment. We note
that the common question class suit has a built-in "safety valve" against
class actions which present a significant number of separate issues of
law or fact. The common issues must "predominate.""x 0 For example, a
case based on common law fraud where reliance on defendant's mis106. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness"

of Class Actions, 58

F.R.D. 299 (1973).
107. Handler, 24th Review 770-75; Simon, supra note 64, at 381-82. See Hazard,
The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973).

108. Simon, supra note 64, at 381-82.
109. Handler, 24th Review 771-72.
110. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b) (3); see text accompanying note 57 supra.
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representation raises an issue of a substantive nature, personal to each
class member, may well be outside the scope of rule 23. However, even
in that situation, class treatment of the common issues, such as the misrepresentation of a fact and the intent to deceive, may be justified
in particular cases. Frequently, those issues are the very core of the
controversy. Most of the evidence may be directed to them. If they
are decided in plaintiff's favor, the remaining issues may turn out not
to be genuine at all, permitting disposition by summary judgment."'
Rule 23 gives the court a wide range of discretion in sanctioning the
class treatment of severable issues. 1' 2
Class actions charging violations of the Securities Exchange Acts
and applicable rules present a different problem. The courts' handling
of actions under section 10 (b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
and the Securities Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5-prohibiting
the misrepresentation or omission of facts in securities transactionshas been under particularly heavy fire.11 3 The critics insist that reliance by each individual class member upon the misrepresentation or
omission is a necessary element of a cause of action under this section
and the SEC rule. They also insist that the courts have ignored this
element solely because of their desire to sustain class actions.11 4 However, it has never been clear that reliance is, in fact, an element of
such a cause of action. Courts in other than class action cases have
held that reliance need not be shown." 5 A leading authority in the
field expressed the opinion that "reliance if required in such a case
111.

For an important state court decision sustaining a consumer class action for re-

scission of installment sales contracts on the ground of fraud practiced by salesmen who
used the same standard sales monologue, see Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800,
484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). The case has been widely commented on, see,
e.g., Loulsell, Miller & West, Comments on Vasquez, 18 U.C.L.A. L. RV. 1056 (1971).
112. FEDR. Civ. P.23(c) (4).
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); SEC
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
114. See, e.g., Handler, 24th Review 771-72; Simon, supra note 64, at 381-82; Note,
Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 337, 345-56 (1971).
115. See, e.g., Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798
(E.D. Pa. 1947). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,

153-54 (1971) ("[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision."); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[t]he proper [reliance] test is whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed
to him the undisclosed fact.").
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[of non disclosure of insider's information] may mean little more than
the inclusion of the word in the complaint.""' 6 What the critics have
branded as a blatant disregard of substantive law engendered by the
class action rule may simply be a new development in the substantive law, based on policy considerations quite unrelated to the class
action rule.
Turning next to the problem of lump sum recoveries for the class
as a whole, one finds oneself in one of the most controversial areas of
class litigation. The Eisen case typifies a situation which may be expected to arise with increasing frequency in massive class litigation.
Plaintiff may be able to define a class with reasonable precision. In
Eisen it consisted of all purchasers and sellers of odd-lots on the New
York Stock Exchange during a specified period. The legal basis of the
claim may be clear and definite. In Eisen it was the fixing of odd-lot
differentials in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Finally, the total amount of damages inflicted upon the individuals composing the class may be ascertainable with reasonable accuracy. In
Eisen it amounted to a sum of money equal to treble that portion of
the differentials collected by the brokers which was excessive. There
remains, however, a formidable obstacle to a routine disposition of
cases seeking recovery of money damages on behalf of massive classes.
A large segment of the class may not be identifiable individually by
name and address; and even those who are identifiable may not choose
to respond to a notice to file their claims because of a fear of becoming
involved in a legal process or for any number of other reasons. In Eisen
where the class consisted of an estimated six million odd-lot traders,
only approximately two million could be identified 1 and only a comparatively small number could reasonably be expected to come forward and claim their share of a potential recovery. The district court
in that case was faced with a Hobson's choice of withholding class relief or reaching for the outer limits of the remedy. Rather than to
permit the defendant to retain the fruits of large scale wrongdoing, the
court tentatively approved what has become known as a "fluid class
recovery" in the total amount of damages recoverable by the class as
a whole under the antitrust laws. 18s The district court reserved the
116. L. Loss, 3 SncuRrrns REGULATION 1766 (2d ed. 1961).

117. Eisen 11, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
118. Id. at 264-65. See also In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278

(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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precise definition of the method of recovery and the allocation of the
proceeds pending the establishment of liability and the amount of damages." 9 Applying a sort of "class action cy pres doctrine," borrowed
from the law of trusts, the court viewed with apparent favor the possibiltiy of directing a reduction of future odd-lot differentials until
the "fund" has been exhausted.2O
The decision of the district court in the Eisen case was greeted
with a storm of protest by the antitrust bar. Professor Handler, an
inveterate critic of massive class litigation, viewed the "fluid class recovery" doctrine as creating a new substantive antitrust remedy since
"[i]nstead of the individuals actually injured, the class as a whole
has been substituted as the real claimant."' 2' 1 His views were shared
by Judge Medina who wrote the opinion in the latest Eisen case. 122
The thrust of Professor Handler's argument seems to be that "[t]he
defendants have no oblgiation to pay any moneys to any claimant
other than one who has duly established in a court of law his right
to recover for damages actually suffered."' 123 The flaw in the reasoning
is that under the class action doctrine all members comprising the
class are before the court either in person or represented by the spokesman of the class. It is true that under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act defendant's liability is limited to threefold the damage sustained by the individual plaintiffs. 24 However, a strong argument can
be made that the damages in a "fluid class recovery" are so limited.
For every dollar recovered, there is an individual class member who
has been injured to that extent. The distribution of the damages is
not defendant's legitimate concern. He would have a plausible ground
for complaint only if the total recovery were greater than the total
amount of damages inflicted on all members of the class or if payment
of the judgment would not discharge him from liability to every member of the class.
The reluctance of the courts which have approved "fluid class
recoveries" to allow wrongdoers to escape the consequences of illegal
119. 52 F.R.D. at 264.
120. Id. at 265.
121. Handler, 24th Review 771. See also Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 27 REcoMi oF N.Y.C.B.A. 653, 660-66 (1972) (expounding on Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (antitrust class suit by state as parens patriae for
citizens' treble damages rejected)).
122. Eisen II, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
123. Handler, 24th Review 773.
124. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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conduct because of technical difficulties in proving or allocating damages is by no means a new development in American jurisprudence.
Two well-established doctrines of the law of torts demonstrate this.
First, uncertainty of the precise amount of damage suffered by a plaintiff is not a sufficient reason to refuse an award of damages as long
as there is proof showing some damage and affording a basis upon which
the amount can be reasonably calculated.125 Second, where plaintiff's
damages could have been caused by only one of two or more negligent
defendants and plaintiff is unable to show which one of them caused
the damages, he will recover from all of the defendantsu 6 and the burden of proof on the issue is shifted to the defendants. 2 7 It will be
noted that under the first doctrine, the defendant is in danger of
being required to pay more than his share of compensation and under the second, he may be required to pay for damages which he had
not caused at all. A defendant in a case where a "fluid class recovery"
is granted is under neither of these dangers; for it is the plaintiff
who must show both the total amount of damages and the fact that
the defendant was the cause thereof.
6. Professional responsibility in class actions. Class actions raise
serious and largely unexplored problems of legal ethics. Many of these
problems arise because traditional rules governing professional conduct are not always suitable to public interest litigation and because
the growth of the remedy was too rapid to allow for the timely development of workable standards guiding the profession.
The present Code of Professional Responsibility continues the
common law policy against a lawyer's stirring up litigation or litigating on his own account,us although, strangely enough, he may have
an economic stake in his client's case in form of a contract for a reasonable contingent fee.u 9 Disciplinary rules caution lawyers (1) not to
125. E.g., Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 544 (1940); Smith v. Mendosa,
108 Cal. App. 2d 540, 238 P.2d 1039 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Dalton v. Demos Bros.
General Contractors, 334 Mass. 377, 135 N.E.2d 649 (1956).
126. E.g., Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1927); Benson v. Ross,
143 Mich. 452, 106 N.W. 1120 (1906); Kuhn v. Bader, 89 Ohio App. 203, 101 N.E.2d
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243 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 4

A.L.R.2d 98 (1949).
127. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Murphy v. Taxicabs
of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959). See W. PROSSER, supra note 126.
128. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104.
129. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 13; ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS No. 246 (1942).
See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
63-66 (1953).
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acquire a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation,1
(2) not to accept employment, except in specified cases, from a layman to whom they have given unsolicited advice to obtain counsel for
the purpose of taking legal action, 131 and (8) not to advance or guarantee litigation expenses unless the client remains ultimately liable
32
for them.1
These rules which form an integral part of the American law of
legal ethics work reasonably well when the public interest is served
best by avoiding litigation. They lose much of their persuasive force
when the public interest demands repression of socially reprehensible
conduct and when the law permits a citizen to assume the role of a
private attorney general in pursuit of that goal.
The problem is compounded when the lawyer's economic interest
in the litigation exceeds that of his client, as is normally the case in
small claimants' class suits. In the American legal system the traditional
rule is that the client pays for his lawyer, win or lose, without reimbursement of his legal expenses.13 3 However, the rule has been abandoned in cases where strong public policy considerations prompt the
13 4
legislature to encourage private enforcement of regulatory provisions.
Treble damage antitrust suits belong in that category. 3 In class actions, moreover, it is well settled that the court in its discretion may
allow attorneys' fees payable out of a fund created for the benefit of a
victorious class.' 38 When the lawyer represents large groups of small
claimants, the class representative's individual interest may be negligible although the controversy is very large and the lawyer's investment in time and effort very substantial. Attorney's fees, amounting to
hundred thousands of dollars and occasionally in excess of a million
13 7
dollars, have received judicial approval.

130. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103 (A).

131. Id. DR 2-104.
132. Id. DR 5-103(B)
133. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-19 (1967)
(citing cases). For collected cases, see Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 902-03 (1963).
134. E.g., Fair Labor Standard Act of 1928, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1965); Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (Supp. 1973) ; Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8,

908(b) (1963). See Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 914-32 (1963).
135. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
136. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531-37 (1882); Monaghan v. Hill,
23.91 (1969);
140 F.2d 31, 34 (9th Cir. 1944). See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
6 id. 54.77(2).
137. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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Foes of the class action movement were quick to seize upon these
professional problems to strengthen the opposition to the burgeoning
remedy. They charge that in class actions courts, oblivious of time
honored rules of professional conduct, have condoned violations of
legal ethics, particularly with reference to advances of substantial
disbursements and solicitation of clients.13 It is not clear whether the
normal rules governing advances should apply rigidly in these actions
where the lawyer represents small claimants who, without financial assistance, would lack the strength to undertake the litigation and who
are unable to assume ultimate liability for disbursements. In general,
the federal courts have been conscious of their obligation to control
ethically sensitive procedural steps in class actions, such as notice of the
commencement of the action and settlements. Judges carefully scrutinize the contents of the notice to forestall its use as a device for solicitation of claims;139 they jealously guard the interest of the public and
the represented parties, when passing on applications for judicial approval of settlements.140 There may occasionally be overgenerous allowances which reflect judicial uncertainty about the role of private lawyers in class litigation. On the other hand, as Kalven and Rosenfield
once observed, the lawyer "is awarded a large fee because he has performed a large service .... ,,141
What we need is a searching examination of the professional obligation of the bar in public interest litigation, including class actions,
stockholders' derivative actions and public actions, with a view to redefining, in pragmatic and functional terms, the ethical standards of
lawyers in situations which do not readily fit in the mold of a system
geared primarily to self-interest litigation on an individual basis.
7. Some socioeconomic aspects of class litigation. An estimate of

the social and economic costs and benefits of class litigation depends
on the appraiser's sense of values. Those who assign high priority to
equalizing forensic opportunities for litigants of unequal economic
strength and to providing effective remedies for otherwise irremediable
legal wrongs are likely to conclude that the social gains of rule 23
138. Simon, supra note 64, at 392.
139. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 653 n.245.
140. E.g., Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972); Sertic v. International
Brotherhood of Carpenters, Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972).
141. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cim.
L. REv. 684, 716 (1941).
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far outweigh its costs. On the other hand, those who believe that
mass litigation threatens the integrity of the adversary process and
may lead eventually to a redistribution of wealth view the newly emerging mass remedies with suspicion.
Whether class actions pose a threat to the existing social and economic order is highly debatable. More likely, they are a stabilizing factor in society because they provide an opportunity for voicing mass
grievances in an orderly fashion within the framework of the existing
system which is fundamentally oriented towards private vindication of
private rights. 142 Class actions, in a sense, are an antidote to the social
frustration which is inevitable when neither administrative agencies
nor courts are able to protect the rights of citizens. As we are aware,
administrative agencies are often reluctant to tackle politically powerful offenders. 143 Even if willing to act, administrative agencies may
lack the resources and legal weapons to provide compensatory relief,
often a more effective deterrent of illegal conduct than injunctions
or other prospective relief.
One of the most astonishing arguments against group redress for
small claimants runs as follows: since a defendant who settles a consumer type action for a substantial amount will charge the price of
the settlement to the expense of doing business, the recovery will be
reflected in higher prices to the ultimate disadvantage of society at large.
The proponents of the argument do not stop to speculate about the
economic damage to society when massive wrongdoers are permitted
to fleece the public with impunity.
More convincing is the warning, heard frequently, that massive
class litigation poses a serious threat to the economic existence of the
opponent of the class. It is argued that the economic destruction of a
wrongdoer by haphazard action of private litigants may inflict greater
harm on society than forgiveness of past wrongdoing. 144
It is true that defendant's risk in mass litigation is commensurate
to the size of his wrong. In some cases the escalating effect of a group
remedy may, indeed, render its use inappropriate. For example, a
statutory penalty multiplied by the number of infractions may impose
too draconic a punishment upon a wrongdoer and not be in the best
142. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 641-43; Weinstein, supra note 106, at 305.
143. Consider, for example, that Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), chastised the Forest Service for having been "notorious
for its alignment with lumber companies ....." Id. at 748.
144. See, e.g., Henson, Panel on Class Action, 28 Bus. LAwYER 138, 141 (1973).

CLASS ACTIONS

interest of society. On the other hand, the economic annihilation of the
wrongdoer may, on occasion, effectuate the very policy unlerlying the
penalty. Interpreting the legislative intent is for the courts. This interpretation should find expression in the order allowing or disallowing the maintenance of the action.- 45 In a recent case, plaintiff sued to
recover a statutory penalty of $100 minimum together with costs and
reasonable attorneys fees for violation of the Truth in Lending Act of
1968.148 The complaint charged a bank with failure to show a nominal
annual percentage rate of interest on periodic statements 'rendered to
its credit card holders. Since a recovery was sought for 130,00 ' possible
class members, the stake was $13,000,000 plus costs and attorneys' fees.
The court, exercising its broad discretionary powers under the federal
rule, denied class status to the action, 147 'but allowed legal fees of
$20,000 to the attorneys for the plaintiff-a fee that would have been
out of proportion had the action proceeded on an individual basis. In
effect, the court treated the action as an instrument to assess a fine
on the defendant in the form of attorneys' fees for the benefit of
plaintiff's lawyer rather than the government, as would be the case in
a qui tam action. 148 Using a qui tam suit rather than a class action ac-

cords with a suggestion by Chief Judge Friendly that "consideration
might be given to civil fines, payable to the government, sufficiently
substantial to discourage engaging in such [evil] conduct, but not so
colossal as to produce recoveries that would ruin innocent stockholders or, what is more likely, produce blackmail settlements."'149 The
difficulty with this suggestion is that no fine in an amount much less
than the illegal profits amassed by the defendant would effectively
deter him or other potential wrongdoers from similar predatory practices.
As a practical matter, a wrongdoer usually can avert economic disaster by an appropriate settlement. Moreover, it would seem to be
145. FED. R. Ci. P. 23(c) (1).
146. Ratner v. Chemical Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
147. Most class actions brought under The Truth in Lending Act after the Ratner
case did not fare well. See, e.g., Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla.
1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972).
148. A qui tam action, created by statute, is a suit by a private citizen against another private citizen to collect a monetary penalty. The proceeds are shared by the
plaintiff and the government. Plaintiff need not show that he suffered damages, Sqe
Kafin & Needleman, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to Protect the Environment, 17
.
N.Y.L.F. 130 (1971).
149. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
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within the court's discretion to set terms for the payment of a judgment to a victorious class in accordance with the financial capacity of
the defendant, in order to avoid harsh economic and social consequences, such as loss of employment. A recent New York draft of a
class action statute contains an express provision to that effect. 150
Few class actions ever reach the trial stage. They usually are settled.
Spokesmen for the defendant bar contend that a massive common
question antitrust suit leaves the opponent no practical alternative save
a settlement. 15' As Professor Handler sees it "[a]ny device which is
workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and
expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it
is a form of legalized blackmail.' 52 The court of appeals in the Eisen
53
case adopted that reasoning uncritically.
There is another and perhaps more persuasive explanation for the
prevalence of settlements in class litigation. Antitrust and securities
fraud cases which form the bulk of common question cases in federal
courts are notoriously difficult, complex and protracted. They involve
substantial litigation expenses and require specialized and competent
counsel on both sides. It is quite unlikely that a law firm equipped to
handle that type of case for a plaintiff class would commit its resources
to litigation of such magnitude unless the claims are meritorious. It
is usually the procedural problem that poses a formidable obstacle
to realization and enforcement. Numerous class actions have been
commenced which did not achieve class certification. They were dismissed, not on the merits but on the issue of manageability 5 4 The
Eisen case proves the point. Once the procedural obstacle of class certification is overcome, the defendant may find it to his best advantage
to settle, not because the litigation is expensive and unmanageablea circumstance which plays more into his hands than the plaintiff'sbut because defendant's chances to prevail on the merits are slim.
Professor Handler's indignant rejection of the notion "that every anti150.
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151. Handler, 23rd Review 130; Simon, supranote 64, at 388-89.
152. Handler, 23rd Review 130.
153. Eisen 11, 459 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973).
154. E.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50
F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 1 73,879
(E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972); Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 301 F. Supp. 980 (D. Hawaii 1969).
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trust defendant, without exception, is guilty as charged in a private
complaint and that every plaintiff has suffered recoverable damages" 155
is pregnant with an admission that many, though certainly not all,
massive class actions which have survived the purgatory of class certification and sometimes a preliminary "merits hearing" have substance.
There remains the charge, often heard, that class actions press a
multitude of disinterested claimants into a litigation combine that
produces negligible economic benefits for the individual claimants
but makes the attorneys the "true beneficiaries and real parties in interest."'15 The argument overlooks the therapeutic effect of class actions which, like stockholders' derivative actions, are a potent deterrent
of illegal and socially destructive conduct. While the in terrorem effect
of class actions cannot be measured in dollars and cents, it certainly
affects sober corporate decision making and should be weighed in passing judgment on the social value of the remedy.
II
SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

The American device for enforcing substantive rights of a corporation against its own management and others is the stockholders' derivative action. It permits a shareholder to establish himself as representative of the corporation for the purpose of maintaining the action
when the regular corporate functionaries do not act, 15 7 usually because

they themselves are the wrongdoers or because majority in control of
the corporate affairs does not want them to act. 56 Such an action has.
a clearly defined public interest aspect when a minority stockholder
sues on behalf of a large number of minority stockholders, often small
investors, to vindicate the rights of the corporation against its management and others. 59 In that case, the action combines features of a
155. Handler, 23rd Review 131.
156. Id. at 132.
157. See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944). A stockholders' derivative action "in essence is nothing more than
a suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right running to the fiduciary as
such. .. ." Id. at 425.
158. In one of the earlier derivative actions brought in the United States, a stockholder successfully sought to enjoin the tax collector for the state of Ohio from collecting
an unconstitutional tax on the corporation where the corporation had declined to take
that action itself. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
159. See, e.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959)
(shareholders' derivative action on behalf of several hundred thousand stockholders).
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"consumer-type class action and a derivative action. Two differences
from a standard class action, however, should be noted. The first is
'that there is no requirement in a derivative suit that the shareholders
be too numer6us to be joined.'-0 The second is that the rights litigated
in a class action are always those of the members of the class and the
'recovery runs directly to them, whereas in a derivative suit the rights
litigated are those of the corporation and not the plaintiff-shareholders'
rights against the corporation or third parties. 161
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 62 illustrates a typical situation
suitable for a derivative action. Mrs. Surowitz, a shareholder with an
investment of approximately $2,000, charged that the officers and di,rectors of the corporation had manipulated the market price of the
-corporate stock to an inflated level; that they had then sold some of
their stock-holdings to the corporation at the artificially high price,
thereby depriving the corporation of badly needed working capital;
that they had caused the corporation to purchase shares of another
:corporation in which they had an interest at an artificially high
price; and that they had received a substantial portion of the proceeds
of that transaction. After a futile attempt to raise technical objections
to the action,0 3 the defendants agreed to pay to the corporation
$825,000 in settlement of the suit.0 4
. Not every derivative action proceeds in the form of a class action.
-Stockholders' derivative suits may be instituted by a shareholder in his
individual capacity representing only himself as, for example, when he
:.owns all the minority stock.'0 5 Even such a derivative suit is not devoid
-of puiblic interest aspects; for quite apart from much needed protecItion of the. rights 6f large groups of small investors, the interests of
consumers, corporate employees and creditors and the economic wellbeing of .the nation demand sound corporate management. 0 0 The
trend toward corporate control of the national economy, 0 7 the progres160. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1, quoted infra note 175.
161. Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).
162. 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
163. See text accompanying notes 177-81 infra.

164. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1966, at 69, col. 6.
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, quoted infra note 175.
166. See Sullivan, The Federal Courts as an Effective Forum in Shareholders' Derivative Actions,. 22 LA. L. REv. 580 (1962).
167. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 2 (1965);
-Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. R1v., 74, 78-79 (1967).
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sive separation of corporate ownership from corporate control168 and
the enlargement of powers wielded by management 69 accentuate the
public importance of a remedy designed to hold corporate fiduciaries
accountable for their conduct.
Stockholders' derivative actions are an invention of equity to
compensate for the absence of an adequate remedy at law. 7 0 Their
history reflects a bitter struggle between forces intent on preserving
the strength of the remedy and management groups which would enfeeble its effectiveness and severely limit its use. Since undeniably
derivative suits lend themselves to abuse in the hands of unscrupulous
suitors, it is understandable that most attacks on the remedy posed as
crusades against so called "strike suits" instituted for extortionate purposes. The arguments used by opponents of derivative suits thirty or
forty years ago sound familiar to observers of the present battle between friends and foes of class actions. For example, compare the recent attack of the American College of Trial Lawyers' 7' on massive
class actions with the 1944 Survey and Report of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, charging that "[d]erivative actions
have come to harbor as a matter of course solicitation and inducement
in bringing them, champerty and maintenance in their prosecution,
the brokerage of litigation in their trial, and division of fees with lay172
men at their conclusion."
Today, stockholders' derivative actions are firmly entrenched in
the American system. The prevailing view seems to be that derivative suits perform the task, assigned to them by equity, of being "the
chief regulator of corporate management,"'173 not only for the protection of stockholder interests, but indirectly for the betterment of society at large. While it is not possible to reconcile the conflicting interests of the competing forces in all respects, it is fair to say that the
governing law represents a reasonable compromise of the interests of
both management and shareholders. The compromise took the form of
168. Berle, supra note 167, at 4, Dykstra, supra note 167, at 79.
169. Dykstra, supra note 167, at 80.
170. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Koster v.
Londermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947).
171. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 90.
172. Sullivan, supra note 166, at 601 n.67, citing CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
STATE

OF NEW YORK,

SURVEY

AND REPORT REGARDING

SUITS 48 (1944).
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For a criticism of the Report, see Hornstein, The Death Knell of
Stockholders Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944).
173. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
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legislative control measures which, after some hand-honing by the
judiciary, are working fairly well.
The particular procedure which must be followed in order to institute a shareholders' derivative suit in the federal courts was first
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in 1881 as Equity
Rule 94.174 The basic provisions of this rule have survived to this day.
They are to be found in rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 175 The individual states have enacted their own rules and
statutes governing this type of proceeding but, as federal rule 23.1
is representative of these provisions, this discussion will focus upon
some of the distinctive features under the federal practice. 7 0
Verification of the Complaint. Federal rule 23.1 requires the
plaintiff in a shareholders' derivative action to verify his complaint by
oath. This requirement, a holdover from the old Equity Rule, stands
in marked contrast to the abolition of verification in ordinary plead174. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881). "Federal Rule 23(b)
is only a scrupulous re-enactment of the old equity rule established in Hawes v. City of
Oakland .... " Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737. Equity Rule 94 was replaced in 1912 by Equity Rule 27. The latter was
followed by FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1938), since repealed, which also applied to unincorporated associations.
175. Effective July 1, 1966, original rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was replaced by rule 23.1, Derivative Actions by Shareholders, and rule 23.2,
Actions Relating to Unincorporated Associations. Present rule 23.1 reads as follows:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have.
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons
for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative
action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1.

176. For comprehensive treatment of the federal practice, see 7A C. WRIOT & A.
& PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1821-41 (1972); 3B J. MOORE,

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIE
FEDERAL PRACTICE

ch. 23.1 (1969).
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ings.177 A narrow reading of this outdated provision would have doomed
many a derivative suit, had not the Supreme Court interpreted it in an
enlighted fashion. In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,178 plaintiff, an
immigrant with little education and limited knowledge of English,
verified her sixty page complaint, relying on the advice of her son-inlaw, a law school graduate, and her lawyer, but was unable to show at
a pre-answer oral examination that she really understood the pleading
that she had verified. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' verification was false "because she swore to the verity of alleged facts of which she was wholly
ignorant."'179 The Supreme Court, taking a more realistic view, reversed. 80 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, observed that,
under the lower court's restrictive view, a derivative suit would never
be available to an uneducated shareholder who is not versed in economic matters.' 8 '
Contemporaneous ownership. Another provision is intended to
strengthen the policy against "strike suits," champerty and the collusive creation of federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship
of the litigants. 82 It requires the plaintiff to have owned the shares
at the time of the objectionable transaction or to have acquired them
later by operation of law.' 83 In addition, plaintiff must be a shareholder
84
at the time of the suit.
Adequacy of representation.As in class actions, where the plaintiff holds himself out as representing the interests of others similarly
177. Ordinarily, pleadings in federal courts need not be verified or accompanied
by an affidavit. However, they must be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, or by the party if he is not represented by an attorney. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11.
178. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
179. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 606 (7th Cir. 1965).
180. 383 U.S. at 363.
181. Id. at 372. A federal court of appeals has since approved the verification of a
pleading in a representative suit by plaintiff's attorney. See Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d
694 (7th Cir. 1971). The procedure apparently was sanctioned by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the Surowitz case. 383 U.S. at 374.
182. See City of Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1887); Hawes v. City of
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1881).
183. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 28 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
184. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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situated there must be a finding that he can do so fairly and adequately.8 5 Unfortunately, however, there have been very few decisions
which have interpreted this requirement in the context of derivative
suits although there are problems peculiar to actions of this type. It is
dear that the plaintiff's interests must not be antagonistic to the interests of those he is seeking to represent."8 6 It is also fairly well-established that the plaintiff need only represent those shareholders who
desire that the corporation's right be enforced.187 This interpretation
is prompted by practical considerations. Almost always, the corporate
decision not to enforce a right reflects the will of the majority of its
shareholders. In fact, Federal Rule 23.1 provides that, to maintain the
suit, the plaintiff must have attempted to have the directors and, in
some instances, the shareholders take the action desired unless such
an attempt would have been futile.'
Security for expenses. Several states have adopted "security-forexpenses" statutes which require certain plaintiffs-shareholders to post
security to cover the expense to the corporation of defending the action. 89 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,10 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that these statutes were substantive in nature and, therefore, also applicable to derivative suits when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
Res judicata. The corporation normally is a necessary party to a
derivative action. Since the corporation is present, it is bound by the
judgment or by a settlement of the suit.'9 ' Furthermore, where notice
and representation are adequate, a judgment or settlement is binding
upon nonparty shareholders as well. The conclusive effect on nonparty
185. See Levin v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);

FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1.

186. Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co., 449 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1971).
187. Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969).
188. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
189. The first state to adopt such a statute was New York. Ch. 668, § 61-b, [1944]
Laws of New York 1455, as amended, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp.
1972). Since then many other states have followed suit. See Dykstra, supra note 167, at
88-89. For criticism of the trend, see Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUMt. L. REv. 1 (1947); Hornstein, The Death Knell of Shareholders'
DerivativeSuits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. RaY. 123 (1944).
190. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
191. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (settlement decree); Dana v. Morgan 232 F. 85 (2d Cir. 1916) ; Ratner v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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shareholders is justified since it is not their right but that of the corporation that is the subject of the litigation and since they are represented in the litigation. 19 2
Dismissal or compromise. Before an action under federal rule
23.1 may be dismissed or compromised, notice must be given to the
shareholders and court approval be obtained. 193 The purpose of the
provision is first, to allow other shareholders an opportunity to intervene and maintain the suit themselves if they are dissatisfied with the
terms of a proposed settlement and second, to ensure that the action
is not settled or dismissed just to benefit the plaintiff-shareholder and
his attorney and to prejudice the corporation and other shareholders.19 4
III
PUBLIC INTEREST

AcrIONS

Introduction

This final section deals with an important new development in
the area of federal public law: the widening trend toward litigation by

private individuals and organizations to enforce "public rights." 195 This
trend parallels and complements the recent developments already discussed in the field of class actions. Although the number of reported
cases is small when compared to class actions, 96 the theoretical com192. See cases cited note 191 supra; Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 939 (1968) (settlement decree); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE

& PROCEDURE:

Civil §

1840

(1972);

3B J.

MOORE,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

23.1.16(3) (Supp. 1972).
193. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
194. Birnbaum v. Birrel, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
195. The term "public interest action," as used in this report, is broader than the
term "public action," used by Professor Jaffe in his writings. Speaking of "public actions," Professor Jaffe refers primarily to actions maintained in the public interest by
a plaintiff who is no differently affected than any other person. On the other hand, I
include among "public interest actions" any action in which a plaintiff who individually
has no protected interest seeks to represent the public interest whether or not the challenged governmental action affects him differently than any other person. See L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADAIINISTRATIvE ACTION 459, 501 (1965).
196. Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 691.1202 (Supp. 1970), which became effective Oct. 1, 1970, only 33 citizen suits were
brought through Oct. 1972. The experience with environmental protection laws in other
states is similar. See CONSUMER INTEREST FOUNDATION: A CASE STUDY (1973) (CIF);
cf. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 90, at 4, B-15 (class action

statistics).
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plexity of the subject and its sociopolitical implications invite study.
In discussing the topic, I shall start again with an illustration that
highlights the function and doctrinal foundation of public actions.
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station'0 7 the question arose
whether an existing radio station could challenge the grant of a
broadcasting license by the Federal Communications Commission to a
new rival station. Under the applicable Communications Act of 1934 any
person "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by the
agency action was entitled to judicial review.1 8 The existing station
opposed the grant of the license on the grounds (1) that, if the license
were granted, the loss of advertising revenue and the insufficiency of
available talent would threaten the plaintiff's economic existence;
and (2) that an additional station in the area would not serve the
public interest, convenience and necessity. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had no property right in the airways and that the
Act was not designed to protect a licensee against competition. Nevertheless, the Court granted standing to appeal to the objecting station,
not to vindicate its economic interest, but rather to sustain the public
interest in adequate radio service. The rationale of the decision was
that Congress in permitting judicial review of the agency action "may
have been of the opinion that one likely to be financially injured by
the issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in
the action of the Commission in granting the license."'" 0 The doctrinal basis of the decision was further strengthened by a later decision dealing with one radio station's application to stay an order of
the Commission allowing another radio station to change its frequency and increase its range. The Supreme Court said:
The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in communications ....Congress gave the right of appeal to persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by Commission
action ....

But these private litigants have standing only as repre200

sentatives of the public interest.

197. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The case has been widely discussed in the literature.
See, e.g., L. JAFFE supra note 195, at 515-16; Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents,
and Administrative Justice, 37 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 33-35 (1972).

198. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
199. 309 U.S. at 477.
200. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (emphasis added);
accord, FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
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A comparison of Sanders with the Eisen case, discussed above,
should make it dear that class and public interest actions share at
least two characteristics. Both present to the Court issues which are
larger than the individual interest of the litigant who appears in court;
and both seek to assure a just resolution of the controversy by genuine
adverseness and adequate protection of the interests represented. However, the doctrinal approach and the procedural techniques for judicial
control of the two devices differ sharply.
Public interest actions are concerned with the implementation
and enforcement of rights vested in the general public or a segment
of it. Normally they challenge an alleged unconstitutional or illegal
exercise of power by the political branches of the government. Class
actions, on the other hand, operate in the private as well as the public
sphere. Many class actions owe their "public" character not to the
subject matter of the litigation, which may be strictly private, but to
the mass effect of the judgment and the impracticability of maintaining separate actions.
Class actions proceed on the theory, or perhaps more appropriately
fiction, that all persons affected by the litigation are before the court,
either in person or by representation. 2 0 1 It is true that the class repre-

sentatives are self-chosen or, in defendants' classes, chosen by plaintiff; but the constitutional conscience of the court is eased by the presence in court of persons whose claims typify those of all members of
20 2
the class and by the lack of practicable alternatives for mass litigation.
There is normally no problem of standing to sue in class actions; for
if the plaintiff is a proper party to press his individual claim, he invariably also has standing to sue on behalf of those whom he represents.
Public interest actions are structured differently. Unlike the class
action plaintiff, the public interest plaintiff does not purport to represent any particular individual. He acts as a spokesman for the public
at large or a segment of it. Neither problems of notice nor of res
judicata, so troublesome in class actions, 203 plague public interest litigation. If plaintiff succeeds, the benefit of the judgment accrues automatically to the general public through injunctive, declaratory or other
relief, restraining or invalidating the governmental action. On the
201. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
202. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 612.
203. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra;Homburger, supra note 11, at 610-12,
643-47.
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other hand, if the government prevails, under the present doctrine,
stare decisis rather than res judicata should discourage a renewed attack by another public interest plaintiff. 204 There is no requirement in
public interest actions, as is true of class actions, that the complainant's
individual interest be representative or typical of the public interest.
In Sanders, for example, the existing radio station relied on the interest of the general public in adequate radio service to promote its
economic self-interest. Adequate representation in public interest actions is assured, not by the similarity of the interests of the plaintiff
and the public at large but, absent statutory authorization, by the
standing requirement which as interpreted by the courts requires that
the public interest plaintiff have a sufficient stake in the outcome of
the litigation. Most importantly, while a class action must fail when
the plaintiff has no substantive, legally protected right, there is, as
Sanders shows, no similar requirement in contemporary public interest litigation. The point is crucial since it bears directly on the
range of public interest actions.
The discussion which follows in part A, traces the evolution of
the law of standing, so important in federal public interest litigation.
205
Part B reviews the present law as gleaned from three leading cases.
In examining the materials which follow, it should be kept in
mind that in the American system the ordinary courts, rather than
separate administrative tribunals, are entrusted with the power to review the constitutionality and legality of governmental acts. 200
A. The Evolution of the Law of Standing in Public Interest Actions
Broadly speaking, the concept of standing is concerned with the
question of whether a person is the proper party to present a particular
issue to the court for adjudication.20 7 More specifically, in public in204. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L,
REv. 645, 681, 684 (1973).
205. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83

(1968).
206. See R.

SCHLESiNGER, ComPARAi-vE LAW

243-45, 347-65 (1970).

207. Professors Hart and Wechsler state that the concept of standing is concerned
with "the question whether the litigant has a sufficient personal interest in getting the
relief he seeks, or is a sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested persons

to warrant giving him the relief, if he establishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same
token, to warrant recognizing him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue
of illegality." H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
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terest litigation the question is whether the plaintiff is a proper spokesman for the public interest which he purports to represent. The word
"proper" hides a body of law of great complexity and uncertainty. 0 8
A meandering stream of Supreme Court decisions reflects two sharply
conflicting policies which compete for recognition. One, mindful of
the doctrine of separation of powers, protects the political branches of
the government against haphazard judicial interference at the behest
of a private party who asserts no individual substantive right. The
other policy favors effective citizen participation in guarding the public against illegal exercise of governmental power.20 9 Affecting the relative weight of these policies is the courts' concern in protecting the
judicial branch from being overwhelmed by litigation which deviates
from the primary judicial function of adjudication of the legal rights
of individuals.210 No rule has been fashioned as yet that will accommodate these competing policies into one simple formula.
Public interest actions are not newcomers on the American scene.
Leading writers have produced convincing historical evidence that the
SYSTEM 174 (1953). For leading texts on the law of standing, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADIINISTRATIVE ACTION 501-94 (1965); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE,

§§ 22.00-.21 (Supp. 1970).

208. Professor Davis asserts that "the purpose of the law of standing is to protect
against improper plaintiffs .. .that should be its only purpose." K. DAviS, ADnINISTRATIVz LAW TEXT § 22.04 (3d ed. 1972). Professor Jaffe states that "[t]he law of standing
is basically a judicial construction with statutory overlays of uncertain effect." L. JAFFE,
supra note 195, at 502. Professor Gifford views the law of standing as an instrument
to impress upon courts and administrative agencies new or preferred referents for decisionmaking. Gifford, supra note 197, at 33-45. Professor Scott argues that the law of
standing serves the rationing of scarce judicial resources and the allocation of responsibility for policy making among the different branches of government. Scott, supra note
204, at 670-90. No wonder that Professor Paul A. Freund called standing one of "the
most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of the public law." Hearings on S. 2097
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 498 (1966).
209. Compare, e.g., Justice Warren's affirmance of the principle that a taxpayer
may not "employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances
about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System,"
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968), and Justice Harlan's concern over "the extraordinary character of public actions, and of the mischievous, if not dangerous, consequences they involve for the proper functioning of our constitutional system, and in particular of the federal courts .... ." Id. at 114, with Justice Douglas' willingness to grant
general standing to sue to private attorneys general "to complain of any invasion of their
rights under the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth or under any other guarantee in
the Constitution itself or the Bill of Rights." Id. at 132 (Douglas, J., concurring).
210. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger voiced the same concern when in an address to the American Bar Association he warned: "People speak glibly of putting all the problems of pollution, of
crowded cities, of consumer class actions and others in the federal courts." 56 A.B.A.J.
929, 933 (1970).
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English law of the eighteenth century sanctioned suits by private litigrants challenging illegal governmental action and that at the time of
the adoption of the American Constitution "strangers" could maintain them without showing a special personal stake in the litigation.1 1
In virtually all the states of the Union, actions to vindicate the public
interest by challenging illegal acts of local authorities have been available since early days. Most states also allow public interest actions to
attack illegal governmental action above the local level. For example,
taxpayer suits are available in almost all states 2' 2 and the federal courts
have experienced few difficulties in reviewing the constitutionality
13
of state and local expenditures.2
In contrast to the receptiveness of the states to public interest
actions, developments on the federal level were slow and tortuous.
The federal law of standing to sue, which crystallized in the early part
of the century, created a formidable barrier to private challengers of
illegal federal acts affecting the public interest.214 In general, the dominating view in the first half of the century was that it should be left
to the public authorities responsible for preventing abuse of governmental power to vindicate the public interest. Only a violation of a
specific legally protected interest of the individual complainant gave
215
him standing to sue.

211. See Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969). See also L. JAiFE, supra note 195, at 239 et seq.,
462-75; Jaffe & Henderson, judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins,
72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1965).
212. See Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 109-10 (Douglas, J., concurring); K. DAVIS,
supra note 207, at § 2.09-10; Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69
YALE L.J. 895 (1960). But see St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192
N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964) holding that the
constitutionality of a state statute may be tested only by one personally aggrieved. See
Quirk, Standing To Sue in New York, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429 (1973).
213. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But see Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
214. See, e.g., L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940). "[T]o entrust the vindication of this public interest to a private litigant professing a special stake
in the public interest is to impinge on the responsibility of the public authorities designated by Congress." Id. at 306.
215. Brief mention should be made of the common law tort liability for a public
nuisance. At common law a public nuisance was a minor criminal offense against a common right of the general public. The offense covered a broad range of injurious activities, such as polluting rivers, obstructing highways, keeping brothels, disturbing the public
by loud noise, etc. The common law crime eventually was absorbed into statutory criminal
law. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 1967). In addition to exposing the
offender to criminal prosecution, a public nuisance gives rise to a private common law
action if plaintiff suffered particular damage different in kind from the damage inflicted
upon the general public. While the action incidentally serves the public interest, it is
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To illustrate, in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA 218 plaintiff
power companies which had no standing under any special statute
sought judicial protection against competition by defendant, a public
corporation. They based their complaint on the ground that defendants'
subsidized operation was unconstitutional and damaged their business.
The Supreme Court held that a threat of injury could not serve as a
basis for standing "unless the right invaded is a legal right-one of the
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 217 Plaintiffs had no legally protected right since "the damage consequent on
competition, otherwise lawful, is in such circumstances damnum
absque injuria, and will not support a cause of action or a right to
sue." 218 While TVA's operations affected the plaintiffs differently than
the public at large, the alleged unconstitutional activities of the government did not violate any specific legal right of the plaintiffs, setting
them apart from other members of the general public. As the court
said in a later case, "to have standing in court [plaintiffs] must show
an injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished
from the public's interest in the administration of law."2193
This "legal right" doctrine extended beyond competitors' actions
into the general area of consumers' and taxpayers' suits. For example,
in City of Atlanta v. Ickes 220 Atlanta, a large-scale coal consumer, was
denied standing to challenge the lawfulness of an administrative minimum price order.
One of the important cases of this early period was Frothingham
v. Mellon,221 a taxpayer action. The Supreme Court ruled that a federal taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal grants to states to reduce maternal and infant mortality. The taxpayer, Mrs. Frothingham, contended that Congress by enacting the
statute had violated its taxing and spending power and thereby increased her future federal tax liability in violation of the tenth amendessentially a private suit instituted to vindicate plaintiff's individual legally protected interest. Public nuisance actions therefore encountered no standing problems in the American law. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 583-91 (4th ed. 1971).
216. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464

(1938).

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

306 U.S. at 137-38.
Id. at 140.
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
308 U.S. 517 (1939).
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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ment 22 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution. 223 The Court concluded that plaintiff's "interest in the
moneys of the Treasury. . . is comparatively minute and indeterminable" and the statute's effect upon future taxation "remote, fluctuating
and uncertain." 224 Consequently, the taxpayer lacked the type of "direct injury" necessary to confer standing. It is not enough to have
standing, the Court said, that the taxpayer "suffers in some indefinite
225
way in common with people generally."
The Sanders broadcasting case, discussed at the beginning of
this section, 226 was a turning point in the evolution of the law of standing. Retrospectively seen, Sanders sounded the death knell to the "legal
rights" doctrine. For the first time in the 20th century, the Supreme
Court squarely determined standing in light of public interest criteria.
Its primary concern in granting standing to the existing radio station
was the public's right in adequate radio service. Plaintiff gained standing under the applicable statute as an "aggrieved party," despite absence of a legally protected interest, because the complainant's economic self-interest motivated it to press the public interest arguments which the Court deemed essential for a correct decision. In the
period that followed, courts tended to adopt the Sanders philosophy
whenever statutes authorizing judicial review employed language similar to that construed in Sanders. A great many statutes fell into that
category, including the Administrative Procedure Act. 22 7 In a much
cited case, 228 a federal judge underlined the peculiar quasi-official status
of a public interest plaintiff by calling him a "so to speak, private At222. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
223. The due process clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution provides:

"No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .

.. .

224. 262 U.S. at 487.
225. Id. at 488.
226. See text accompanying notes 197-200 supra.
227. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." An argument could be made that notwithstanding similarity of language, standing criteria envisaged under general review provisions of special statutes (such as the
Communications Act in Sanders) differ from those applicable under the Administrative
Procedure Act when the complainant seeks review unsupported by any special statute. Id.
228. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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torney [General]. ' 229 That expression has since been used time and
again-by courts and writers both in class and public interest litigation.
As time went on, the courts widened the bases for standing under
the general statutory review provisions. In addition to economic injury,
environmental, recreational, conservational, spiritual and even aesthetic
injuries were considered sufficient to support standing in public interest actions. 230 The concept of "injury in fact" replaced the "legal
right" formula in a multitude of cases where the public interest was
deemed to be in need of effective private representation. A few appellate courts, intent on strengthening the movement toward functionalism, were at the brink of scuttling even the widened injury
test. They seemed to suggest that a person is "aggrieved" if he can
demonstrate a special concern for, or commitment to the public interest invaded by illegal governmental action. 231 For example, in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Committee v. FPC,232 an association of neighborhood landowners sought to invalidate a license granted by the
Federal Power Commission to construct a hydroelectric project. The
Court in conferring standing upon the committee, said:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas,
must be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties under
233
section 313 (b) [of the Federal Power Act].

It is quite apparent from this language that the court was not as concerned with traditional requirements of standing, which recognized the
landowners as "injured" parties, as it was with the capacity and qualification of the Committee to act as spokesman for the public interest
and to focus attention on factors which the court deemed essential for
229. 134 F.2d at 704.
230. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPO, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966).
231. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d
Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
232. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
233. 354 F.2d at 616.
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a correct agency determination of the contested issues. The law of
standing, as one writer put it, was turned "into a device for restructuring agency decision making by impressing new referents [in the sense
of decisional standards] upon the agency and ensuring that those re2 34
ferents are heeded."
In a limited, but slowly expanding area, the notion of the "private attorney general" was explicitly sanctioned by statute. For example, at the state level, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of
1970235 permits private citizens to bring polluters to court. At the federal level, the Federal Clean Air Act 236 assigns an important role to individual citizens in enforcing a strong federal policy against air pollution. Generally, any citizen may sue any polluter, including governmental agencies, for a failure to comply with the Act without demonstrating any direct personal harm resulting from the pollution.
Constitutionally, federal "citizen suits" pursuant to congressional
authorization received a clean bill of health in a celebrated case when
a highly respected federal judge more than thirty years ago stated
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any
non-official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons,
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation
of his statutory powers; for then there is an actual controversy and
there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving
such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the pub237
lic interest.
On the other hand, private attorney general suits without explicit
Congressional authorization are still struggling for recognition in the
234. Gifford, supra note 197, at 3, 42.
235. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1972). Other states followed
suit. See, e.g., Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 116B (1971);
Florida Environmental Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1971).
236. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970). See also Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 11 1972);
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Supp. II 1972). For a critical discussion
of environmental citizen suits, see Crampton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental
Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 ECOL. L.Q. 407 (1972).
237. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 703 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), vacated
and remanded, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). The Supreme Court has since adopted Judge
Frank's view. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968)
(Warren, CJ.) ; id. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, "at least in the absence of
a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction." 410 U.S. 186 (1973). But see text accompanying notes 271-80 infra.
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federal courts. A review of the current federal law will show that
recent Supreme Court decisions have halted the movement towards
a functionally oriented federal law of standing. Indeed, they seem to
revive a conceptualistic approach to standing in public interest litigation.
B. The CurrentLaw of Standing-Retrenchmentor Regression?
Three cases dominate the current federal law of standing to litigate. They are, in the order of discussion, Flast v. Cohen,238 Sierra Club
v. Morton,239 and Association of Data Processing Service Organiza240
tions,Inc. v. Camp.
1. Flast v. Cohen.24 1 Responding to growing pressure for a ruling
on the constitutionality of financial aid to religious schools, the Supreme Court in 1968 artfully designed a rule that was broad enough
to accommodate the issue tendered and yet worded so tightly that it
continued the general bar to taxpayers' actions, as enunciated in
Frothingham v. Mellon.2 2 Except as modified by Flast, the Frothingham rule, discussed briefly in part A,243 remains intact: a taxpayer
lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal public
expenditures. The rule fashioned under Flast turns on the taxpayer's
stake in terms of a nexus between his status and the alleged constitutional infringement. In order to gain standing the taxpayer, in addition to establishing a logical link between the type of legislation challenged and his status as taxpayer,244 must show "that the challenged
enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to
Congress by article 1, section 8.245 In Frothingham, the taxpayer at238. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

239.
240.
241.
242.

405 U.S. 727 (1972).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
262 U.S. 447 (1923).

243. See text accompanying notes 221-22 supra.
244. The Court pointed out that under this test "a taxpayer will be a proper party
to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing
and spending clause of art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege
an incidental expenditure of the tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." 392 U.S. at 102. The plaintiffs both in Frothingham and Flast met that
test.

245. 392 U.S. 102-03 (emphasis added).
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tacked a federal spending program on the ground that it violated the
tenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment of
the Constitution.246 Both provisions were classified by Flast as merely
general limitations on the taxing and spending powers of Congress. By
contrast, the establishment clause of the first amendment 247 involved
in Flast, was held to operate as a "specific constitutional [limitation]
upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power." 248
Professor Davis succinctly commented: "The Court did not explain
wherein the First Amendment is more 'specific' than the Tenth Amendment, and one may wonder whether it is." '240 One may also wonder
whether the Constitution contains other limitations which are specific
enough to qualify under the Flast test. The Court left the quesion
open, stating that it would have to be "determined only in the context
of future cases." 250 As a practical matter the outlook does not seem
bright for taxpayer actions outside the limited area of the establishment
cases.
Puzzling as the Flast case is, it becomes more understandable if
viewed against the Court's practical dilemma. Clearly neither the taxpayer who challenged the Maternity Act in Frothingham,nor those who
challenged the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in Flast were
affected by the legislation complained of differently than any other
taxpayers. Both Frothingham and Flast were what Professor Jaffe has
called "non-Hohfeldian" or "ideological" plaintiffs, that is plaintiffs without any private, legally protected interest.25 ' Both cases
seemed to fit into the category of public interest actions and to require
like treatment. Of the nine judges sitting in Flast, only one, Justice
Douglas, concurring in the result, was ready to overturn Frothingham
and to grant general standing to taxpayers or, for that matter, to any
private attorney general who wished to challenge governmental action
violative of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the Bill of
246. See notes 222-23 supra.
247. The establishment clause of the first amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ....." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
248. 392 U.S. at 103.
249. K. DAVIS, ADINISTRATIVE LAw 427 (3d ed. 1972). See also Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968).
250. 392 U.S. at 105.
251. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Idealogical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968). A Hohfeldian or nonidealogical plaintiff is one who "is seeking a determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity,
or a power." Id. at 1033.
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Rights. 25 2 Justice Harlan shared Justice Douglas' view that the federal
courts have the constitutional power, without congressional authorization, to confer standing upon private plaintiffs whose sole purpose is
to vindicate the public interest. However, it is one thing to have power,
and quite another thing to exercise it. Justice Harlan thought the
exercise of this power, absent congressional authorization, unwise, impolitic and fraught with danger to the tripartite constitutional system.
He therefore, was the lone dissenter who voted in favor of dismissing
253
the complaint for lack of standing.
All other justices wanted to reach the merits of the case while
maintaining the general ban on public interest litigation absent a
congressional grant of standing. Two of them would have permitted
a taxpayer action expressly limited to cases arising under the establishment clause.2 " The majority, speaking through Chief Justice
Warren, preferred to fashion a general rule that opened the door to
the federal courts just far enough to permit Flast to slide in, albeit
awkwardly. To achieve that end, the Court incongruously measured
the locus standi of a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff with a sort of Hohfeldian
tape, marked according to plaintiff's "personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy."2 5 5 As the Court put it, the stake assures "concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."2 58 Since the Constitution restricts judicial authority to the
adjudication of "cases" or "controversies" and since that restriction in
turn implies a limitation of the judicial business to questions presented in an adversary context, the majority opinion maintained
a constitutional link of uncertain strength between the concepts of
standing and the "case or controversy" requirement of the Constitution in public interest litigation. 257
Once the court had adopted a definition of standing in terms
of plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome, the difference between
Frothingham and Flast had to be found in the quality and nature of
that stake. The court detected that difference in the specific constitu252. 392 U.S. at 107-14 (dissenting opinion).
253. Id. at 116-33 (dissenting opinion).
254. Id. at 114-16 (dissenting opinion).
255. Id. at 99, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
256. Id.
257. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1381 (1973).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

tional protection afforded taxpayers against compulsory taxation infringing upon freedom of religion, which was held to be more personal than the broad protection of the tenth amendment and due
process clause of the fifth amendment involved in Frothingham.Thus,
the Court came close to saying that the establishment clause, through
its impact on the congressional taxing power, endows the individual
taxpayers with a specific legally protected interest that warrants standing; for that interest converts what normally would be a public interest
action into a private or semi-private action. The same result might
have been reached less artificially, had the Court, in determining the
question of standing in Flast, focused on the importance of the issue
itself rather than its relation to the litigants. If the issue was otherwise
justiciable, the Court might have entertained the action as a straightforward citizen suit despite absence of a legal right to review. Instead
of getting enmeshed in novel subtleties of specific versus general constitutional limitations, the Court might have developed functional criteria for conferring standing as a matter of discretion on private plaintiffs in public interest actions. In Flast, these criteria might have included the questions whether the public interest was best served by determining the constitutional issues raised by financial aid to religious
institutions and whether, as a practical matter, these issues could have
258
been presented for judicial resolution in any other way.

2. Sierra Club v. Morton.25 9 Leaving aside general citizen attacks
on governmental action, unsupported by any statutory review provision i la Flast, and citizen suits authorized by Congress in special areas
of public concern, one finds oneself in the core area of public interest
litigation. That area covers the whole spectrum of administrative action reviewable under general statutes at the behest of a private party
who is "aggrieved" or "adversely affected.

'2 0

When may a private

citizen or organization invoke these provisions to vindicate a "public"
right in the absence of an individualized legal wrong? This is the vexing question which has baffled the legal profession ever since the
Sanders broadcasting case opened the federal courts to public interest
litigation.
In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court considered one aspect of that
258. See text accompanying note 270 infra; Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L.

Rav. 633, 637-38 (1971).

259. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
260. See text accompanying notes 226-34 supra.
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question, namely, whether the Administrative Procedure Act 261 requires a direct injury to the party who seeks judicial review. The Court
held that only a person who himself has been injured may claim standing to sue as a party "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action."
He then may assert the right of the public in support of the relief
sought. 62 As the Court saw it, the existence of a "public" right goes
to the merits only and has no bearing on plaintiff's standing to litigate.
Applying that restrictive notion, the Court denied plaintiff, a nonprofit club with a special interest in environmental protection, standing to challenge the conversion of a game reserve into a privately
operated resort. There was no doubt about the organization's commitment or capacity to present relevant arguments against the project.
Nevertheless the club was held not to be a proper plaintiff because it
had not alleged injury to itself or its members as users of the game reserve.
The notion of the "injured private attorney general," adopted in
Sierra Club, in no way impairs, the principle that any "injury in fact,"
economic or noneconomic, including environmental, recreational,
spiritual or aesthetic injury, suffices to lay the foundation for standing.2063 Since the extent of a noneconomic injury is not easily measured
objectively, Sierra Club supports the conclusion that even a trifling
injury qualifies.2 4 The Court's individualized injury test is significant
because it firmly repudiates the notion that private organizations with
a special interest in areas of public concern may obtain standing as
parties "aggrieved" by governmental action touching that concern. 265
Nevertheless, the Sierra Club case may have little practical effect on
public interest litigation. Organizations such as the Sierra Club should
not find it too difficult to plead and prove injury to its members or to
join other litigants "injured in fact."
It will be noted that the Court in Sierra Club carefully distinguished between the type of injury that sustains standing and the
person who may claim standing. Virtually any kind of injury, whether
261. See note 227 supra.
262. 405 U.S. at 737.
263. Id. at 734.
264. This is Professor Davis' thesis. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others,
35 U. CHi. L. REv. 601, 613-17, 629 (1968). Professor Davis' views are cited with approval in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),

93 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14 (1973).
265. 405 U.S. at 739.
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shared by few or by many, qualifies; but only a party who directly
suffered injury may complain about it. That distinction is practical
when the extent of the injury and its direct impact on a person can be
measured objectively, as in the case of an economic injury. The functional purpose of the Courts' analysis becomes unclear, however, when
the injuries involved can not objectively be measured. For example,
the extent of an aesthetic injury cannot be measured, nor can a
plaintiff's claim that his sense of aesthetic values has been offended be
verified. In defense of its mechanistic approach the Court observed
that the injury in fact test serves "as at least a rough attempt to put the
decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who
have a direct stake in the outcome."26 6 Were it otherwise, the Court
argues, there would be no objective basis for denying standing to any
other organization or private citizen with a bona fide special interest. 2 7
Implied in the Court's reasoning, although not clearly articulated, are
two functional arguments: (1) a broad reading of the review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act might flood the federal
courts with public interest litigation; (2) measuring plaintiff's stake
by his individual injury in fact is better than to have no test at all. Both
arguments are vulnerable.
Even if all organizational or private plaintiffs could secure standing, were the individualized injury test abandoned, no drastic consequences are likely to ensue. The experience of state and federal courts
seems to indicate that, under wide-open statutes authorizing citizen
suits, the volume of public interest litigation is small. 2 8 These suits
are very expensive and not lightly undertaken. The financial risk involved in litigation acts as a potent deterrent to amateurish and baseless challenges of governmental action.
Concerning the second argument, if the required personal stake in
the outcome of the litigation is to serve a functional purpose, it should
be geared to the plaintiff's qualification to present the public arguments, and not merely to "injury in fact" which, particularly if small,
gives little assurance that the public interest will be adequately protected. Yet, it is the adequate protection of that public interest which
is an essential ingredient of public interest litigation.209 Moreover, why
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 740.
Id. at 739-40.
See note 196 supra. See also Davis, supra note 264, at 634.
See 405 U.S. at 758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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should the public interest plaintiff's ideological values rate lower than
his aesthetic or spiritual values? Finally, why should plaintiff's professional qualifications be disregarded if, indeed, as Professor Jaffe insists,
the court has discretion to grant or deny standing to a plaintiff who has
no protected individual interest, but seeks to argue the public interest?27 0 Courts are well acquainted with procedural techniques for
evaluating the qualification of expert witnesses. Similar standards
might be used, where needed, for testing the qualification of public
interest plaintiffs to speak for the public. What has been said is not
to suggest that the question whether the public interest plaintiff suffered injury in fact is irrelevant. It does suggest that injury should not
be the sole or even an indispensable factor in conferring standing on
a spokesman for the public interest.
The Sierra Club approach was put to a test in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).271 In
Sierra Club the environmental impact of the agency action was limited,
affecting directly only those who used Mineral King Valley for recreational purposes. Their individual interests as park-users set them apart
from the general interest of the public in preserving the nation's forests,
streams, and wildlife sanctuaries. The question remained how the
Court would deal with a claim of illegal government action affecting
generally, but equally the whole population. If in this case every inhabitant may assume the role of spokesman for the public interest,
"we are well on our way permitting citizens at large to litigate any
decisions of the Government which fall in an area of interest to them
and with which they disagree." 272 If, on the other hand, the nonexistence of persons who are differently affected than any one else spells
lack of standing for all, "the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody" 2 73 save the government
itself.
In SCRAP an environmental group formed by five Washington,
D.C., law students protested the refusal of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to suspend a surcharge on railroad freight rates insofar
as it affected the cost of transporting recyclable materials. The students
contended that a detailed environmental impact study, as required
270.
tion. See,
271.
272.
273.

Professor Jaffe in his writings has convincingly argued in favor of this proposie.g., Jaffe, supranote 258, at 633.
93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).
Id. at 2435.
Id. at 2416.
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by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,24 should have

been undertaken by the Interstate Commerce Commission before it
acted on the request to suspend the operation of the new tariff.275

In order to avoid standing problems the students carefully conformed their pleading to the requirements of Sierra Club. The complaint recounted in elaborate detail the various uses made by each
individual student of the natural resources in Washington, D.C., and
surroundings and in the area of his legal residence, including the use
of the air for breathing, and described the harm to each student flowing from the environmental impact of the rate increase. "7 " Labored
as these allegations were, they produced the desired result. SCRAP was
granted standing to sue. 27 7 Of the eight justices sitting in the case, three

were of the opinion that proof of injury in fact suffered by the plaintiffs in their individual capacity was not needed to establish standing. 278 Two others concluded that the pleading met the Sierra Club
test 27 9 although "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the

country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar
to that alleged by environmental groups here" and although the "far
more attenuated line of causation" between the rate increase and the
individual injuries claimed by the students was "far less direct and
perceptible" than in SierraClub.28 0
SCRAP may be viewed as a victory for the environmentalists or,
perhaps, quite generally for those who favor broadening of the right
of citizens to protest illegal government action affecting the public
interest. The holding may stand for the proposition that the Administrative Procedure Act sanctions citizen suits at least in those situations where the illegal agency action affects the public at large and
there are no individuals whose special stake in the controversy gives
them a preferred claim to standing. The pleader's window dressing to
274. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (c) (1970).
275. Under § 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970), the
Interstate Commerce Commission may suspend the operation of proposed freight rate
increases filed by the railroads for a period of seven months.
276. 93 S. Ct. at 2411.
277. The Court placed its standing decision squarely on the alleged violation of the
students' environmental interests, thereby avoiding the question whether the economic
injuries also claimed by the students fell within the "zone of interests" intended to be
protected by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. See text accompanying notes
281-91, infra.
278. 93 S. Ct. at 2422, 2424 (opinions of Blackmun, Brennan & Douglas, JJ.).
279. Id. at 2414-17, 2435 (opinions of Stewart & Marshall, JJ.).
280. Id. at 2416.
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show individual injury in fact might as well be dispensed with when
the whole population is harmed by the agency action and no person is
differently affected in a significant way than any other person.
3. Association of DataProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp.28 1
A perplexing problem was presented by the Supreme Court to bench,
bar and academe in a neat package of ambiguities in its decision in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp. Its impact on public interest litigation cannot yet be measured with any degree of assurance. The plaintiff, a seller of data processing services,
challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency which allowed
national banks to provide data processing services to bank customers
and other banks. Plaintiff's theory was that the ruling violated the Bank
Service Corporation Act of 1962282 which limited the activities of bank
service corporations to the performance of services for banks. The crucial question was whether plaintiff had standing to sue under the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 28 3 The

Court, after first conceding that "[G]eneralizations about standing to
sue are largely worthless as such,"28 4 nevertheless articulated a twopronged standing test. The first prong is old hat. Plaintiff must have
suffered "injury in fact." We already considered that part of the test
in discussing the Sierra Club case. The second prong of the test, however, is new. It requires that "the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 28 5
There is no doubt that "the interest sought to be protected" is complainant's interest. That much was made clear by a dictum in Sierra
Club which specifically tied complainant's injury in fact to the "interest zone" of the statute allegedly violated by the agency action.28 6
However, the impact of the "interest zone" test on public interest litigation and the meaning of the word "arguably" remain unclear.
An easy way to defuse Datawould be to read the "zone of interests"
281. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also the companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970), which applies the "Data" test.
282. Bank Serv. Corp. Act § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1962).
283. See note 227 supra.
284. 397 U.S. at 151.
285. Id. at 153. Justices Brennan and White concurred in the result although
they considered the "interest zone" test a "wholly unnecessary and inappropriate second
step upon the constitutional requirement for standing." Id. at 169.
286. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
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test as relaxing the standing requirements in competitors' private
actions, as distinguished from a public interest action. As early as
1924, in the heyday of the "legal wrong" era, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to ground standing on a violation of a statute enacted
for the purpose of protecting their competitive position. 287 In the
same vein, it sustained in 1968 plaintiff's right to judicial review
"when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest. '2s8 It could be argued
that the Supreme Court in Data further relaxed the statutory-purposetest by requiring merely an "arguable" position when plaintiff seeks to
bring himself within the protective zone of the statute or regulation
on which he relies. Depending on the meaning of the word "arguably",
the final determination of plaintiff's standing would either be finally
decided at the trial after a tentative threshold determination or up'2 9
held on the basis of mere "arguability. s
Unfortunately, neither the Court's reasoning in Data nor later
decisions support such a narrow reading of the "zone of interests" test.
In Sierra Club, a typical public interest action, the Court went out of
its way to make it clear that in deciding that case it did not reach "any
questions concerning the meaning of the 'zone of interest' test or its
possible application to the facts" presented. 21 0 While that remark, contained in a footnote, does not close the door to a holding that the "zone
of interests test" is confined to private actions, its possible impact on
public interest litigation must be considered; for if the test does apply,
it would severely restrict the class of potential public interest plaintiffs.
Only those would qualify who could rationally argue that the challenged governmental action violated a constitutional, statutory or administrative rule designed to protect them from the sort of injury in
fact which they suffered. It is this author's opinion that such a result
would be contrary to the Sanders philosophy20 1 and eliminate many
plaintiffs who are strongly motivated to present the best case for the
287. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). For discussion of case, see
L.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

507-10 (1965).

288. Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
289. See Jaffe, supra note 270, at 634.
290. 405 U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1972). See also United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 n.13 (1973). Two prior
cases shed little light on the point in question. See Investment Company Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per
curiam).
291. See text accompanying notes 197-200 supra.
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public. Indeed, it is quite doubtful whether Sanders would have passed
the "zone of interests" test since the Court in that case explicitly found
that the Communications Act was not designed to protect the licensee
against injury by competition. The Sierra Club case provides another
illustration of the same point. Had the Club amended its pleading to
show that its members included visitors of the game refuge, it probably
would have passed the "zone of interests" test since the threatened
injury was arguably within the protective range of the federal statutes
and administrative regulations designed to preserve national parks,
forests and game refuges. Assume, however, that an association of motel
owners adjoining the game refuge had filed the complaint because the
project threatened their economic existence. Clearly there would have
been economic injury in fact. It would seem, however, that the motel
owners would fail the "zone of interests" test. Although their financial
stake in the controversy would strongly motivate them to present all
available public interest arguments in opposing the project, they could
hardly claim that the laws and regulations for the preservation of game
refuges were designed to protect the private economic interest of the
motel owners.
CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding sections we examined three different types of litigation with public interest aspects: class actions, stockholders' derivative suits and public interest actions. Stockholders' derivative actions
required only brief treatment. After a stormy past, they found a safe
niche in the American system of civil procedure and are here to stay.
No radical change in their basic structure is likely to occur in the
near future.
The situation is different when we turn to litigation more directly
concerned with the public interest: class actions and public interest
actions. Their status is unsettled and their future uncertain. Both are
designed to make justice accessible to sizeable groups or to the public at
large. Both suffer from the difficulty of fitting them into the framework
of a procedural system geared to the adjustment of specific rights and
obligations of individual litigants.2 92 American judges are not accustomed to viewing civil litigation as a mass cure for legal ills afflicting
large groups of persons or the general public. Moreover, our traditional
292. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-67 (1973).
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tools of procedure are ill suited for such larger purposes. Uncertainty
about the function, scope of application, doctrinal foundation and
methods of operation of both class actions and public interest actions
have produced much confusion and at times, firm resistance to their
expansion. Yet, there is a growing recognition that ways and means
must be found to give effective judicial protection to group and public
interests which in the past have often been unrepresented or underrepresented in the judicial process. Eventually, it is hoped, workable
doctrinal formulations will emerge from a clash of conflicting policies
and produce a system of reasonable stability, consistency and predictability, embracing the whole spectrum of private suits in the public
interest.
Taking first actions maintained by private individuals or organizations as representatives of the public interest, it was noted that the
courts have relied on the nebulous law of standing to sue in an attempt
to sort out proper litigants. The results are discouraging. Public interest litigation has fallen into a doctrinal quagmire from which it can
no longer be extricated without a radical change in approach. Decades
of struggling with an assortment of standing tests, based on "legal
right," "economic injury," "injury in fact," and most recently the
"zone of interests,"2 93 have yet to produce greater certainty than existed
when the movement toward expansion of standing started more than
thirty years ago.
Without claiming ability to furnish answers to questions which
have perplexed so many others, this author would venture to say that
the past difficulties encountered in working out functional solutions
in the area of public interest litigation have at least two fundamental
causes. One is the futility of attempting to assemble all the elements embraced by the concept of standing to sue in a few simple rules of operation. It is true, of course, that the law of standing is concerned with
no more than determining who is the proper party to present a certain claim in court. It may also be true, as Professor Davis has argued,
that rules of standing should not be expected to provide answers to
questions such as whether the law suit is a "case or controversy,"
whether it is moot, ripe for decision, etc. 20 4 However, it is difficult to

follow Professor Davis when he concludes "that a very simple and nat293. See text accompanying notes 215-34, 285 supra.
294. Professor Davis' view is summarized succinctly in K. DAVIS,
LAW TEXT 427-28 (1972).
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ural proposition is entirely sound: One who is in fact adversely
affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge that
action if it is judicially reviewable." 295 Professor Jaffe has pointed out
that the law does not always give a remedy to one who is in fact
hurt by illegal action. 296 Perhaps even more important is the failure
of the Davis formulation to recognize that the complex fabric of
standing has fibers of all sorts, including some spun out of considerations of practical policy. These weigh heavily in a tribunal which cannot escape a measure of political orientation.2 97 In Flast the Court observed that standing "is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability"29 8 and that justiciability, in turn, is
"not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific
verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures ....

.,, 99The

very uncertainty of the concept of standing may be

its strength. As applied to public interest litigation, it enables the court
to pick and choose among public issues those which are appropriate for
judicial determination and to reject others which the court wishes to
avoid on grounds of political expediency. In short, the Supreme Court
may quite properly use lack 'of standing as a convenient escape route
to avoid, postpone or disguise its disposition of sensitive policy issues
when other escape routes such as "political question," "mootness" and
"ripeness" are inappropriate.
A second factor contributing to the prevailing confusion stems
from a misconception of the true nature of public interest litigation.
The opponents facing each other are the government on the one side
and a significant segment of the public on the other. The "private
attorney general" is no more a party to the litigation than his counterpart, the "public attorney general." Both are merely spokesmen for
two sides of a public issue. This is true whether the spokesman is selected by election, appointment, act of Congress or judicial approval.
If these propositions are correct, the practical conclusions follow
readily. The "private attorney general" who has no legally protected
295. K. DAVIS,
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§ 22.18 (1958).

296. Jaffe, supra note 270, at 635-36.

297. See H. ABRAHAm, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 355-77 (2d ed. 1968); A. BICREL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 132 (1962); M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
WORLD 79-83, 98 (1970). See also Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court
FunctionalAnalysis, 86 Hv. L. REv. 645, 683-90 (1973).
298. 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968).
299. Poev. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961).
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individual interest should not be subject to any standing test. Instead,
absent explicit congressional authority to act, he should pass a functionally oriented test evaluating his qualifications to represent the public issue forcefully, faithfully and effectively in an adversarial contest. Included in this judicial scrutiny should be his motivation, experience and ability to gather the facts and present the legal arguments
relevant for a proper disposition of the issues. Substantial injury in fact
may well have a bearing on his qualification, but should not be necessarily decisive. A trifling injury in fact, on the other hand, should be
disregarded if not supported by other qualifying circumstances.
The concept of standing should probably be preserved despite
its amorphous character. However, instead of granting the locus standi
to the "private attorney general" it should be conferred upon the public issue which, for the purpose of the litigation, might be "reified" or
"personified." Justice Douglas, dissenting from the majority in Sierra
Club, suggested the "conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their preservation." 30 0 That notion should be expanded.
There is no reason why environmental litigation, important as it is,
should be singled out for special treatment. Justice Douglas' suggestion
to grant standing to "Mineral King," (the game and forest reserve involved in Sierra Club) is but a shorthand expression for the "reification" and "personification" of the issue involved in the Sierra Club litigation, namely whether the conversion of that wild life reserve into
a populated resort area should be permitted. Similar notions of "issue
standing" could be extended over the entire area of public interest
litigation. This would produce binding adjudications of the public issue
involved so long as there was adequate representation although, of
course, private litigants with individual, legally protected interests who
were not parties to such litigation would not be bound by res judicata.
Yet, stability of the law would be assured through application of the
more elastic doctrine of stare decisis.
A functional approach to the concept of standing might enable
litigants to resort to public interest actions in some situations where
300. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural Objects,
45 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 450 (1972). The author in that article made a plea for giving
"legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so called 'natural objects' in the environment-indeed to the environment as a whole." Id. at 461. In support of his plea, the
author points to other familiar examples of fictional entities and inanimate objects which
the law has endowed with legal personality, such as corporate bodies and ships. Id. at 455.
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they now rely heavily and often unsuccessfully on class actions. As
noted before, class actions are not hampered by standing problems
comparable to public actions because, in theory at least, all the claimants are before the court, either in person or by representation. 30 1 That
approach works reasonably well when the class is limited in number
and clearly defined. Even the Eisen appellate court, hostile as it was to
massive class actions, observed that federal rule 23 "provides an excellent and workable procedure in cases where the number of members
of the class is not too large." 30 2 However, as the class grows in size

and identification of individual members of the class becomes more
difficult, the class action gradually assumes characteristics of a public
interest action. Plaintiff is not so much interested.in the rights of the
individuals whom he purports to represent, as in the rights of the
group as such.30 3 The larger the class, the more difficult it becomes to
distinguish between the interests of the class and the interests of the
general public or a segment of it. Individual notice to the members,of
an oversized class and the assessment and distribution of individual
301. See text accompanying notes 16-18, 201 supra.
302. Eisen II, 459 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973).
303. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corps., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E. 887,
335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) provides an illustration of a case in the twilight zone between

class and public interest actions. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of New
York's liberal abortion law in the state courts. Apparently the plaintiff was conscious of
New York's longstanding hostility to public actions challenging the constitutionality of
state legislation. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d
15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964); Quirk, supra note 212.
An alternative and equally difficult route was a class action under New York's outdated
class action provision. See text accompanying notes 36-51 supra. The plaintiff chose the
class action approach and succeeded procedurally. In a sense, the situation resembled
that presented by Flast. In both cases there was strong public pressure for a judicial pronouncement on an urgent question that raised important legal and moral issues. The
court disposed of the procedural question in five words: "No party questions the procedure." 31 N.Y.2d at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392. One wonders what
would have happened, had one of the defendants questioned the procedure. In order to
reach the merits of the case via a class action, the court had to perform a procedural
miracle. Implied in allowing the action to proceed as a class action is a holding that a
fetus is enough of a person to bring an action prior to birth, not only in its own behalf
but also on behalf of "all similarly unborn children," and that the threat of destruction
to each individual fetus by abortion constituted a question of "common or general interest" sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "privity" among the members of the class.
See text accompanying notes 36-51 supra. The court finally decided that the abortion
statute was constitutional on the ground that children in embryo need not be recognized
as legal persons or entities entitled under the Constitution to a right to life. In short,
the embryos were persons procedurally, but not substantively. That result might have been
reached in a less circuitous route had the court accorded standing to the question of
constitutionality of the abortion law and approved the plaintiff as a representative qualified to argue the public issue.
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damages may as a practical matter become impossible. The tendency
is to measure damages in such cases in terms of the harm inflicted
upon society and to use a recovery for the benefit of society at large,
or a segment of the public, and not for the reimbursement of damages
sustained by the individual members of the class. Thus, in environmental class actions plaintiffs' overriding objective may well be to prevent harm to the natural resources and to restore the damage already
inflicted upon the environment for the benefit of society rather than
any particular individual. The fluid recovery doctrine espoused by the
federal district court in the Eisen case 3°4 was but another attempt to
convert a massive class action into a sort of hybrid between a class and
public interest action. While the court of appeals roundly condemned
that approach and rejected a class action as an appropriate means to
vindicate the rights of "immense numbers of consumers who have been
mulcted in various ways by illegal charges," it took pains to point out
that "some means should be provided by law for the redress of those
wrongs to the community and to the society as a whole." 30°0 The time
may not be distant when a new, functionally oriented public interest
action will be available to ease the burden now carried by class actions
with a strong public interest aspect.
304. See text accompanying notes 117-20 supra.
305. Eisen II, 459 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973).

